Everyone loves big planes. The bigger they are the more interesting they become. Famed mammoths like Howard Hughes’ HK-1 “Hercules,” otherwise known as the “Spruce Goose,” and Antanov’s gigantic An-225 “Dream” conger up feelings that man has somehow cheated nature by creating such flying hulks. Even today’s A380, the grand star of any international airport that can receive them, makes people stop in mid traffic just to marvel at it’s imposing form. So what really makes the cut as a gigantic airplane? There is no real criteria, it’s just one of those things that you know when you see it.
Buried deep amongst Aviation’s long line of flying juggernauts is a little known but very remarkable machine that rivals almost anything today in shear size and visual impact, the one of kind Convair XC-99
. The XC-99 was first flown in 1947, seemingly a good year for mammoth aircraft (the Spruce Goose took its only flight in that year as well), in San Diego, CA. The XC-99 was a transport derivative of the legendary B-36 Peacemaker strategic bomber, a six piston engine toting pusher prop aluminum beast that became a staple of America’s long-range strategic strike capability for almost a decade. The idea of adapting the B-36 for the intercontinental transport role was fairly intuitive as the Peacemaker had true intercontinental reach and a sizable payload capability to begin with. Curtis utilized key components of the B-36 to produce the XC-99, although the fuselage was designed quite different from the bomber configuration. The XC-99 disposed of the B-3
6′s long and slender lines and replaced it with a massive double-decker cavernous body. The XC-99 truly looked like the grandfather of the Airbus A380 we know today. In it’s final configuration the aircraft could haul some 400 fully outfitted troops over long distances or over 100,000lbs of cargo.
Although the aircraft was considered literally a large success, the USAF never ordered any production examples. The jet age was right on the horizon and although the XC-99 was highly capable, many in the USAF’s leadership believed that investing further in maintenance intensive and finicky piston powered aircraft as something of a dead-end. Regardless, the XC-99 was put into service for 7 years, mainly as the B-36 fleet’s cargo hack. During the Korean War the lone XC-99 would fly from B-36 depot to depot and base to base full of parts in order to keep the complex Peacemakers flying.
By 1957 the XC-99 was increasingly expensive to maintain and operate and after 55+ million pounds of cargo and 7500 hours of flightime she was retired at Kelly Air Force Base. She remained at Kelly for almost a half century until 2004 when she was disassembled and brought to Wright Patterson AFB for restoration and eventual display. Sadly, she has remained in pieces outside at Wright Patterson for years as the museum has been struggling with how involved the restoration of the now highly corroded aircraft would be. Regardless of her unfortunate state today this XC-99 was one seriously massive piece of hardware, and to think she could fly almost 10,000 miles on piston motors is just astonishing…
An interesting aspect of the XC-99 program was Convair’s almost successful attempt at turning the massive double-decker cargo-ship into a luxury airliner. Resembling the Airbus A380 of today, the Convair Model 37 would have had open living areas, circular staircases and many other luxury features more reminiscent of high-end trains or cruise-liners than an airliner as we know them today. The Model 37 was configured to carry 210 passengers in an all luxury layout over a 4500 mile distance. Continental even went as far as ordering 15 of these super jumbos of yesteryear, but once they came to the realization of just how much fuel and oil those six massive pistons would consume they pulled out of the project stating that it was economically un-marketable and unless the aircraft could be fitted with turboprops, a cutting edge technology at the time, they could not purchase the planes. Unfortunately turboprops never made it to the Model 37 and what would have been the largest airliner of it’s kind never made it off the drawing board. 
*Photos via Goleta Air & Space Museum, check them out at: http://www.air-and-space.com/
The onset of hypoxia can make it’s victim feel giddy at first, but it is no laughing matter if such a condition occurs while they are piloting an aircraft, or even worse, if they are piloting an advanced fighter traveling at high mach above 50,000 feet while they are deeply engrossed in a three-dimensional engagement with enemy fighter aircraft. In almost any case a hypoxia event occurring while flying an aircraft can be downright insidious and deadly. Often times those who have experienced hypoxia, either in a controlled setting like a decompression chamber, or in an operational environment like the one mentioned above, have referred to it’s strange symptoms of tingling skin, partial loss of vision, total fixation on simple tasks, confusion, spacial disorientation, with as much respect as outright fear. A good description of just how sneaky this physiological condition can manifest itself comes from an RAF Jaguar pilot who stated:”You don’t know what you’ve lost until you get it back…”
elated systems. In other words, this condition can creep up very slowly and sometimes totally unannounced, and as such a person affected by it may not realize they are in danger until it’s too late. In some ways you can think of hypoxia as a set of two intersecting graphs. As the oxygen starvation line increases the other line representing the subjects cognitive ability decreases, so the window where a person could comprehensively self diagnose themselves for hypoxia and take quick action as a result is slim to the say the least. The most interesting thing about hypoxia is that in most cases with just the donning of an oxygen mask and the flip of a switch the symptoms evaporate in just a matter of seconds.
On-Board Oxygen Generation Systems (OBOGS) were developed decades ago in an attempt to lessen the maintenance demands, volatility, transportation needs and weight associated with compressed oxygen storage aboard aircraft. OBOGS works by rerouting bleed air from the aircraft’s jet motors through a complex sieve system and into the pilot’s oxygen mask in a filtered form. The system also works as a way of filtering nuclear, chemical and biological elements in the ambient air outside of the vehicle during times of war. Further, the same system or ones similar to OBOGS can generate inert gas that is pumped into the aircraft’s fuel tanks to lessen the chance of fire during a crash or in the event that the aircraft receives battle damage.
issues at one time or another. The F-22′s OBOGS is not that different (almost identical really) from those installed in other fighters in the DoD’s inventory. The F/A-18 in particular utilizes a very similar system, and early on Naval Aviators had many similar issues with hypoxia related incidents to those that the F-22 is experiencing today. Yet the F-22′s problems seemed to have appeared literally out of thin air (excuse the pun) fairly late in the airframe’s evolution, which would logically point to a durability issue with a specific component in the OBOGS system, although such a cause has not been publicly identified as of yet.
The F-22 is a unique machine in many ways, especially when it comes to it’s operating environment. The Raptor does it’s deadly deeds not at the typical sustained speeds and altitudes frequented by other fighters. Quite the contrary, the F-22′s powerful turbofan engines, massive control surfaces, and thrust vectoring allow it ascend to a perch approaching 60,000ft. From this lofty position the F-22′s sensors can see farther, its missiles can reach out over greater distances, and the jet can maximize it’s tactical maneuvering advantages to it’s full potential. Yet we must keep in mind that a human’s blood will begin boiling off above 63,000ft, this phenomenon is known as the “The Armstrong Line.” Quite literally Raptor pilots are operating at the very edge of their physical limits on an almost daily basis. To help facilitate operations at these hostile altitudes the F-22′s unique g-suit, known as the “Combat Edge,” is really a partial pressure suit designed to inflate if an F-22 pilot were to lose cabin pressure at high altitude. By doing so it would supposedly provide just enough time to dive back down to thicker air before the pilot blacks out or gets a deadly case of the bends. Putting a high performance fighter jet up this high regularly is somewhat of an uncharted territory, one only realized by unique combat aircraft like the Russian MiG-25. Could the F-22′s woes have something to do with the altitudes they operate at? 
After a still mysterious and controversial deadly crash of an F-22 in Alaska in 2010 and continued bizarre physiological occurrences experienced by F-22 pilots, the Raptor fleet was grounded for months last summer. After deep inspections, intense testing and scientific investigation the Air Force could not identify the source of the Raptor’s ailment. Subsequently, in September of last year the USAF announced that the F-22 would be put back into service with a series of new measures put in place to mitigate risk and to collect further data in a continuing attempt at diagnosing the F-22, and it’s pilot’s sickness.
Beginning about a month or so ago I started receiving emails from some of my contacts stating that the F-22′s OBOGS/hypoxia issue was going to “blow up” in the mainstream press. I was told that a couple of Raptor pilots were coming forward to talk at length to the media about the F-22′s oxygen and poisoning issues. I waited a bit to see how this story developed as I have talked about the topic many times before in the past. After the recent “60 Minutes” expose was aired featuring two whistle blowing (or kind-of whistle blowing) Air National Guard Raptor pilots who have refused to fly the F-22 on safety grounds, and the resulting flurry of written pieces and stories that materialized after have come to pass, I think that I am ready to address these developments head-on.
wanted to come forward and expose a deficiency or scandal. These two men, both accomplished combat aviators, took great risk to talk to the press in such an open fashion and without the approval of their command. Their careers in the USAF could have been ruined or highly damaged as a result of their coming forward. Although these men stated some interesting first hand accounts of hypoxia in the F-22, as well as some insight into how the squadrons overall are dealing with this tough problem, such as the talk about the “Raptor Cough,” a physiological phenomenon most likely caused by the aforementioned less than adequate charcoal filters fitted to the jet’s oxygen system as part of the temporary fix that saw the Raptor’s grounding lifted last fall, almost all of the info they discussed were details that USAF had already disclosed in full over the past 12 months or so. In general I really could not define what I was hearing as “whistle blowing” really at all, it was more like disgruntled frustration manifesting itself on national television. Although, maybe others perceived the interview differently.
The USAF is not United Airlines or Federal Express. It is alarming that military pilots will just go to the media kicking and screaming over something like this while refusing to continue to perform their assigned duties. As far as going to the media and talking “off the reservation” about facts that are already in the public domain, I really don’t care much about it. To some it may be in bad taste and unbecoming of an officer, to others its taking things into your own hands. To me it really is an afterthought as like I mentioned before, these men did nothing more than call attention to the issue, which may have even been a good thing in retrospect. Where I do have a major problem is with the fact that they refused to fly the aircraft during this period of time, even though the USAF had grounded the aircraft for months and devised an admittedly less than perfect fix after seeing no anomalies in their investigation. According to the USAF they have done everything they can to solve the issue and are fully committed to continue trying to diagnose and fix the problem. In their interview with Diane Sawyer these two pilots gave no new information that is contradictory to this fact. If these pilots would have said “the USAF knows what is wrong with the F-22 and is unwilling to fix it,” or “there are other dangerous issues that would make any common sense person re-ground the jet immediately” that would be one thing, but they did not come forth with such statements or evidence. They simply quit.
In my opinion the whistle blowing Raptor drivers’ decision to stop flying the aircraft and run to the press is not acceptable and raises many questions about their ability to continue in their combat role. If they had gone to the press while still carrying out their duties flying the jet, even if they did not like it, I really could have cared less about their going to the press with their reservations. Once again, their talking to the press is not really a big deal to me and in some ways I think it helped the situation, but the fact that they would not fly the aircraft as ordered is a big issue to me personally. Getting asked to be reassigned or lateraled to another platform is one thing, but neglecting their duties in the process is totally unacceptable.
You have to ask yourself, how bad does it have to be for a pair of F-22 pilots, seemingly at the top of their game, to come forward to the press alone. What were the discussions or arguments like in the squadron room before such a rogue action was taken? They must have tossed and turned over how they will fare after “blowing the whistle.” Would their security clearances be at risk? There are many factors to consider, and the USAF’s decision to blame the F-22 crash in Alaska on the pilot, Captain Jeff Haney, when the F-22 is having such clear human factor problems was a bad move by the USAF that surely did not help the situation. I have a feeling that many pilots can deal with the heightened hypoxia risk, but maybe the thought of putting their family through such an awful set of circumstances if they went the way of that doomed F-22 pilot in Alaska is just too much to take. Yet it is important to note that these men were pilots in the Air National Guard, not the active force. They were flying under an associate squadron attached to the banner of the 1st Fighter Wing based at Langley AFB in Virginia. There is a good chance that these men have other jobs and that their careers in the Air Force may have been more expendable than that of a front line pilot’s. Further, the Guard’s more localized command structure and more intimate culture may have made such a decision a bit easier to make than if these men were flying with the active force.
It may not be ideal but US military pilots have flown in “cutting edge” hardware that have had major design flaws since America’s entrance into the world of combat aviation close to a century ago. From structural and avionics deficiencies to engine reliability, military aircraft are no stranger to major “livable” design issues. Whenever you try to make something lighter, faster, more agile and powerful tolerances become tighter and not every possible flaw can be perfectly predicted. Look at the F-14A Tomcat which flew for decades with the troubled TF-30 engines installed. These finicky motors could cause inadvertent flat spins upon failure, and compressor stalls during rapid throttle excursion or at high angles of attack, and accounted for almost 30% of all F-14 accidents. Keep in mind the tomcat was a twin-engined aircraft which should be inherently more reliable than a single engine aircraft. Yet even after a proper replacement had been fielded in the form of the GE-F110-400 turbofan engine mounted in the B and D models, old A models with the troublesome and restrictive TF-30s flew well into the new millennium. There are countless stories like the Tomcat’s where aircraft were dubbed “widow makers” or had major design and component problems that were deemed to costly or impossible to fix, in monetary, national security, or scientific terms, yet aircrews still mounted these machines and went into battle with them time and time again. How is the F-22 Raptor any different? Simply put, it is a dark fact that you cannot always go to war with the military you want, sometimes you have to go to war with the military you have.
Now comes the hardest question: should pilots lose their wings for refusing to fly the platform for which they are assigned? This is a tough call. Does losing a pair of Raptor pilots, although apparently there have been others, really make a huge difference in the big scheme of things right now? Probably not. But what about in a time of war? Every aircraft has issues, and during a serious shooting war against a robust enemy with late generation technology American losses could be great and logistical chains could be taxed to their max. In other words pilots may watch many of their friends die in combat and may have to be sent into the fray without the latest missiles or even fully operable systems. Could they simply say “sorry it’s not safe for me to fly this Raptor into combat against J-20s or the latest SU-27s and S400 surface to air missile systems because it’s stealthy skin needs to be reconditioned, or some of the key avionics can not be repaired, or the latest missiles are not available for loading?” To some this may sound absurd, but I don’t think it is. America’s technological and numerological advantage is eroding at a fast pace. Military “parity” in the decades to come on some military levels is no longer a fantasy for rapidly developing states such as China. In other words, as our military capabilities atrophy and our inventories shrink, risk to our warriors increases. If we allow our greatest pilots to opt out of their flying duties over a fairly rare aircraft malfunction that is being examined and worked on as fast as possible what is to say that they will not throw in the towel in a shooting war where not just the enemy’s planes and facilities are blowing up? Also, are pilots treated differently than other military officers? What would happen if a tank commander said he would not step foot in an M-1 Abrams because he thought something about the design was unsafe? Or what if a Navy SEAL refused to go on an assigned mission because he thought rifle he was given was susceptible to jamming? I am not qualified to answer what would happen to these soldiers if they refused to do their duty but such scenarios are interesting comparatives to think about.
I also think that all the blame for these pilot’s actions cannot just be put on them alone. Clearly there was a breakdown in “the process” for these men and their concerns. I think the USAF needs to draw clear lines and eliminate gray areas on this particular type of matter. Maybe a certain provision should be put into place for aircrews who have legitimate concerns with flight safety in relation to their assigned hardware, where instead of sending these crews to a review board or even worse, granting them immunity out of fear of media reprisal after they blow the whistle, they could go through a process of reassignment to a different platform. But this would only make sense if the crews are willing to continue their flying duties until such a process could be completed. Quitting should never be tolerated without adhering to due process unless those involved are willing to take the subsequent administrative reprisal. Some would say: “do you want pilots flying a $200M jet who don’t want to be there?” My answer is this, they are expected to be the best professionals in the world and if they don’t want to be there and are not willing to follow a due process (assuming such a process is created as described above) and they want out of their duties immediately due to a safety concern that the DoD sees as a manageable risk than they should be re-assigned to a non-flying job going forward. The US Government has invested millions of dollars into their training and it does not make sense to continue to do so if they are not willing to continue in their duties until they are reassigned. The risk of investing further in a key individual such as this after such behavior is just to high.
During the recent “60 Minutes” piece it seemed like both Raptor pilots wanted to have the Raptor grounded once again. Their main point appeared to be that the jet was originally grounded for a reason, one for which as full solution has not been fully identified or implemented, which leaves the USAF’s rationale for putting the jets back in the air again in question. Yet just a few days ago it came out that both men were willing to go back to flying the F-22 now that the charcoal air filter, put in place as part of the USAF’s rationalization for un-grounding the fleet back in September, had been removed. It is of important value to note that one of the pilots who appeared on “60 Minutes” had requested a waiver to fly without the filter weeks prior before going to the press. This waiver was denied with an additional message that clearly stated that he would be in big trouble if he did not continue his flight duties. It appears that the other pilot had not taken a similar action in regards to the filter. So now the pilot’s true message now seems muttled to some extent.
Risk factors pertaining to operating the F-22 in it’s current condition are not limited to pilot safety and fleet preservation. One has to ask themselves when does national security interests trump an elevated risk of losing a pilot and another Raptor, both precious in their own right? The reality is that the F-22 is a major part of America’s national security apparatus and the ability to defend our interests abroad is directly related to it’s availability for deterrent, combat, and contingency operations. Anyone who says otherwise or refers to the Raptor’s seclusion from the Libyan campaign as a sign of it’s ineffectiveness simply has no clue what they are talking about. The F-22 is the platform that will knock down the door of a capable enemy. If said enemy had a decent air arm, not some aging and token force, and the Raptor was not available for combat, the F-15 and F/A-18 fleets would have to counter such a threat alone. Seeing as these aircraft are not survivable over a territory protected by an integrated air defense system we would have to be ready to accept sizable losses. Then there is the integrated enemy are defense system itself. The B-2, America’s only other known stealth attack asset, is great at hitting many fixed targets on a single clandestine pass, but it is not optimized for hanging out over hostile airspace and re-targeting previously unknown radar and radio emitters and other key nodes of an enemy air defense system. The same can be said for incredibly expensive standoff weapons like SLAM, JSOW and JASSM launched by fighter aircraft, or ALCMs launched by the B-52 fleet, and Tomahawk cruise missiles launched by surface combatants. This is where F-22, paired with the Small Diameter Bomb and it’s new upgrade package shines. It can provide unprecedented counter air capabilities while also being able to knock out mobile SAM sites and other “pop-up” threats on the fly, all the while collecting important intelligence on the enemy’s electronic order of battle for follow-up strikes. Nothing in the US arsenal has such a capability. In other words, in the modern age of plentiful advanced SAM systems and Flanker fighters, the F-22 is necessary to shape the battlefield in preparation for more conventional and numerous non-stealthy air-power to gain a foothold. Thus taking the Raptor fully offline and watching it’s pilot corps’ skills atrophy amounts to a substantial risk to national security.
Unless the USAF is hiding something concerning the Raptor’s toxicity, such as a situation where they know what the causes of it’s oxygen issues are but a full fix would cost billions of dollars to implement so they are looking for a workaround, or if the massive technical scrutiny that the Raptor has been under over the last year has brought to light other dangerous flaws that have not been disclosed, than I think they have taken the right basic steps in the matter. This is not to say that the USAF could not have handled the situation much better. This is especially true when it comes to the fatal crash in Alaska. A situation where the supply of bleed air from the F-22s motors had ceased, this bleed air supplies the OBOGS system, causing it too to fail as well as other key life support systems. This predicament left the pilot diving for the deck in the black of night and suffocating in his oxygen mask while fishing around for a poorly designed emergency oxygen pull ring. The USAF claims that the pilot did not react properly in time to the bleed air failure. Some 30+ seconds after the failure occurred, the jet was diving to lower altitude and and Captain Haney was struggling to toggle his backup oxygen supply. He apparently became disoriented in this dive while fighting for breath (literally the oxygen shut off) and fishing around for the hidden emergency oxygen ring, only beginning to pull out of the dive after it was too late. The USAF’s crash board’s conclusions to this mishap, where they blamed the pilot on the crash, seem suspect as the very emergency oxygen ring that Captain Haney had to pull was deemed inadequately designed and was subsequently totally re-engineered after the crash. Further, as we discussed earlier, a pilot flying at 50,000 that looses oxygen only has less than 10 seconds to get reserve oxygen flowing and/or dive down to lower altitude where the air is thicker before losing consciousness. It very well could have been that the suffocating pilot could have turned acutely hypoxic after struggling to pull the inadequate backup oxygen ring in the pitch black cockpit. Further, there is a fair possibility that Captain Haney only realized that he was in dire straits once it was too late to recover the aircraft as he could have been only partially conscious during the jet’s steep decent.
the DoD going forward? I am not lawyer and cannot answer this question, but it is an interesting factor to think about.
On a related note, the USAF really needs to educate the press, many of whom think they are military technology analysts because they have been too Iraq, read the Wall Street Journal, or have worked the Pentagon beat, on what the Raptor’s true capabilities are and how it fits uniquely into America’s future ability to win conflicts even against the most capable of enemies. In recent years there seems to have been a gag order installed across the F-22 program in order to protect it’s “too big to fail” little brother, the F-35. This needs to end as those who have wanted to kill this program for decades have already gotten their wish, sadly the F-22 is fully out of production. The USAF needs to take the gloves off and explain in great detail to the layman just how the F-22 fits into America’s war fighting machine. Further they need to describe how it’s abilities are synergistic with those of the incoming F-35, and even how the Raptor’s capabilities exceed those of the F-35′s in certain respects. Until the USAF says enough is enough and such a media push is made the Raptor bashing and the ill-formed derogatory statements about the jet’s obsolescence will continue. Many highly decorated and respected reporters simply do not understand the intricacies of the ever-changing technology dominated battlespace, a realm where big generalities and superficial conceptual understanding simply does not cut the mustard. The mainstream press’ naivety concerning the F-22 is understandable as it takes years, if not decades to fully grasp the complex and rapidly changing US military puzzle. Sadly, until these folks are really given a true understanding of the Raptor’s capabilities and potential the F-22 fleet will continue to be totally misunderstood and considered by the majority as the USAF’s gold-plated super-fighter boondoggle.
The whole F-22 OBOGS debacle has been unfortunate to say the least. Yet this series of missed opportunities, near-sighted public relations decisions, and sadly the loss of talented pilot’s life does not have to be in vain. The USAF should seize the opportunity to make wrongs right, and change the way they approach these issues on a public relations level, install new protocols for pilots who have safety concerns about their aircraft during a time of peace, and finally learn from the F-22′s engineering design mistakes that grossly inflamed what is an already a challenging problem. In the end the re-engineered emergency oxygen handle that has been installed on all the F-22′s since their grounding cost the USAF only $47 apiece, with the whole order to outfit the fleet totaling under $10,000. This is roughly the cost of 15 minutes of a single Raptor’s flight time. That simple $47 switch could have saved an aircraft worth hundreds of millions of dollars, and more importantly a life. The USAF, DoD and their coddled suppliers need to take a second look at their future designs and think about what if their “perfect engineering” does fail? Are the contingency procedures and pilot interfaces adequate to see such a failure through to a positive conclusion?
Programs such as the F-35, where literally an Apollo type of initiative was put in place to make the aircraft lighter in order to meet design and mission requirements. This weight slashing initiative saw every excess ounce shaved from the jet’s design in order to make the program meet it’s goals. Could such a large and complex design process with incredibly thin weight margins result in even more aggressive “gremlins” embedded deep in the F-35′s guts than it’s heftier F-22 progenitor? The recent F-22 OBOGS flap should be a red flag to the Joint Strike Fighter program office to do everything possible to see that such flaws do not occur with their fighter. Seeing as the F-35′s manufacturer designed a carrier variant of the jet with a hook that cannot even catch a wire what is to say that there are not other less obvious but more severe issues gestating deep within the aircraft’s complex systems? The program has been pushed to move at breakneck speed, and many of it’s flaws are only being seen now during flight testing. This is alarming as flight testing is great, but in the F-22s case the jet was tested well over a decade before the OBOGS issues became clear. Problem solving should really start at the drawing board, not in the cockpit.
Once the F-35 is fully fielded, if a problem of the magnitude currently being experienced by the F-22 fleet, or one more serious occurs, the DoD would probably not have the luxury of grounding the fleet at all as it would mean the vast majority of American tactical airpower would instantly be deemed impotent. This is a hard idea to fathom but one that must be taken into account as we move forward with a one-size-fits-all single fighter design. And that design is already having a myriad of issues. Further, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and the Obama Administration demanded that this single aircraft solution only have one source for it’s complex powerplant. Seeing as the jet motor is really the most intricate piece of equipment on any jet aircraft this maneuver aimed at saving a couple billion dollars in the near term, although it will probably cost us billions in the long-term through lack of competition, leaves the F-35 with a very large single point of possible failure. For as much as the DoD plans for worst case contingencies they seem to have a highly optimistic view of the complex technology they procure. Sometimes machines, no matter how advanced, malfunction. Unfortunately sometimes this can happen in a mysterious and chronic form. They know this from experience over decade of buying and then flying high performance aircraft. America needs to plan for these eventualities, and putting all your funding behind one troubled design is not conducive to this.
It is never easy seeing an already misunderstood and under-supported weapon system like the F-22, one that rightfully touts itself as the most deadly fighter ever created, handicapped by a strange and very unglamorous anomaly like a malfunctioning or poorly designed life support system. Yet why not seize on the positives of a very negative situation and learn from some very costly lessons thus far? It is clear that the DoD can improve the quality and safety of the products it buys as well as the way it handles itself publicly in the face of complex adversity. The stark truth is that F-22 is not just another fighter, it is the centerpiece of America’s shrinking arsenal and needs to remain potent and ready for battle unless it is absolutely necessary to do otherwise. In the end the F-22 will survive, just as it was originally designed to do, and it will be better than ever once a solution is applied to it’s as of now mysterious ailment. On a personal level I believe in this aircraft’s capabilities to such an extent that I hope the next whistle that is blown regarding the Raptor is at the start of the first shift of a newly restarted F-22 production line where new and improved Raptor variants are being built by the hundreds.
Flightglobal has a nice little piece about the USAF’s confirmation that it will not procure the F-35B, although not mainly due to capability gaps but because the USAF thinks the F-35B has a lower sortie rate than what is desired. Oddly enough the Marines think otherwise, they say the F-35B’s sortie rate will clobber those of the USAF’s A model or the Navy’s C model. As with many things JSF, confusion seems to reign supreme even amongst those at the top of the information ladder.
Why would commanders risk a $150M, unarmored asset low over a city? The reality is that the F-35 will spend it’s career above 15,000ft, outside of the threat of small arms fire, most AAA, and shoulder fired heat seeking missiles. The gun pod being fielded with the F-35B and C, although capable, seems like somewhat of a waste of money as you would have to put the jet at great risk to use it and as far as I know that big F135 motor puts out a lot of heat and the jet does not have a cloaking device, yet. The A-10 was built to do it’s business in environments where reduced radar cross-section is pretty far down on the list of necessities needed in order to get the job done. Further, if there is a robust enemy fighter threat still in place there probably will not be any troops on the ground to support anyways. The whole Marine landing mission is of a totally different story and I do not doubt the F-35B’s validity toward that mission set, in fact I applaud it. I have said time and time again that the most valuable F-35 variants are the B first and the C second, the A being totally dispensable.
Although the USAF may not replace the A-10 with the F-35B there is no reason why the F-35B is still not relevant to the USAF. The aircraft can operate from tiny austere airstrips which would be a big plus in the event of a war in Pacific, where huge concrete runways are big targets and in small supply. The F-35B would allow the USAF to operate by choice from currently non-strategically important islands in the Pacific, which will greatly increase sortie generation rates and tanker dependence via greatly reduced mission lengths. Further the survivability of the aircraft themselves will be greatly enhanced as like any aircraft they are most vulnerable while sitting on the ground.
Admiral McRaven is an all-star in the White House’s mind and many across the services like his brand of special operation doctrine. His new and intriguing idea of a confederated approach to addressing special operations needs around the world sounds like a great idea. Building stronger military ties, especially in the special operations community, is a fantastic way to bring countries closer together and more mindful of each others fears and needs. Further, by working together on a whole new level of international “jointness” that will span borders across the globe, there will be new synergies realized for multinational training and standardization as well as intelligence gathering and sharing. Additionally, high end assets, such as UAV’s and insertion craft could be integrated jointly in an international fashion. For instance, a particular operation in Malaysia that America has a special interest in could be carried out by indigenous Malaysian special forces operators who are trained in common US technologies and procedures, while satellite imagery, Predator over-watch and advanced communications could be supplied by the United States.
Such a concept, possibly analogous to NATO’s military organization but on a geographically broader yet administratively miniaturized level, could amount to America carrying less of the world’s special operations burden. A possibility that is all to enticing after almost a decade constant American special operations engagements around the globe.
The last four years have been littered with orphaned capabilities and weapon systems that were thought of as irreplaceable less than a half decade ago. Much of the time the oldest hardware gets the boot, although these systems are still seen as effective in their roles. This week we have heard of two more “old soldiers” that are on the fiscal cutting block: The Australian C-130H fleet and the Spanish aircraft carrier Principe de Asturias.
serves more as an advanced helicopter landing dock, with provisions for a large ground combatant force and a well deck for transportation of large combat vehicles via hovercraft and landing craft. With the possible mothballing of the Principe de Asturias looming the Spanish Navy may go down to a single ship for which it can operate it’s contingent of advanced AV-8B Harriers.
As predicted here since the day the news hit that the UK would switch their requirement for a carrier fighter from the F-35B to the F-35C the Cameron government and MoD have realized just how near-sighted that decision was and will once again procure the short takeoff and vertical landing capable F-35B. In addition, the savings garnered from not having to install catapults, arresting gear, and other costly conventional carrier associated equipment will apparently allow the Royal Navy to actually operate both carriers that they have already committed to purchase. Under the strategic defense review it was determined that one carrier would be mothballed, possibly shared, or even sold and one would be put into active service. The decision to operate both carriers is great news as having two ships in active inventory will allow the UK to have a single ship almost always available for emergency operations.
The next big question, one we may have to wait a while to have answered, is exactly how many F-35Bs will be procured by the UK? Hopefully the MoD will look at this issue realistically as there is little use for two aircraft carriers if you have no planes to operate on them. I do think it will be inevitable that the USMC will deploy regularly aboard the UK’s Queen Elizabeth Class carriers. If such deployments are proven effective they could turn into a joint-use agreement between the two countries which would see such joint-cruises become standard operating procedure. This would take some serious financial weight off the UK as they would have to purchase less aircraft and it would make sense for the USMC as well, who currently lack a forward deployed squadron in that part of the world.
The F-35′s helmet mounted display (HMD) and the aircraft’s game changing distributive aperture system (DAS) was originally one of the main selling points of the F-35, and without it the aircraft would lose some pretty awesome capabilities that go well beyond easily pointing targeting sensors or 360′ night vision. This is why it was such a disappointment when serious problems with the system, including jitter and latency, in other words lag, were disclosed over the past year or so. The system was so fouled that the Joint Strike Fighter office and Lockheed began integrating a less advanced helmet made by BAE just as an alternative to the more enticing but troubled option. It seems now that there may be a fix in the works that has not been verified in flight testing but has apparently performed well in lab tests. If these fixes work it would be a great piece of positive and worthy news for the troubled program.
DoDBuzz.com has a writeup on the status of the F-35 program that contains some quotes from program lead Vice Adm. David Venlet taken during a recent congressional hearing on the Joint Strike Fighter. The super upbeat and optimistic view on the project held by Admiral Venlet, sprinkled with quick admissions of major problems, is interesting in that its all very nonchalant, almost as if America has all the time and money in the world to fix this thing and make it all work properly:
I find it disturbing that those currently involved on an executive level with the program have no idea when the system will be available for real-world operations. It’s as if the DoD and the private sector have given up on schedules totally. This is NOT a good sign for a program as complex and as expensive as this one, as the program is only 1/4 through its initial test schedule. If the pace stays fairly consistent, with no major mishaps or issues, than one would have to guess the F-35′s true initial operational capability (not a fabricated one that allows the jets to be flown with gobs of restrictions) will come to pass closer to 2020 than previously envisioned.
I think Congress would be smart to haul in folks that are not in the military, or involved with this program or it’s vendors directly, or do not receive a paycheck because of it, such as outside analysts and others, to give their thoughts on the situation. Further, these folks could give their alternatives to the F-35 program and explain to the folks who hold the purse strings that there are other options available to the US military than this aircraft alone. In many ways these other options would result in savings and a more flexible and resilient fighting force. The current congressional echo-chamber where beating up on DoD and industry execs and military brass who have a vested interest in this program have become a ridiculous and circular exercise. By letting some other folks be heard lawmakers may finally realize that they are being duped day in and day out by the same car salesman who sold them this lemon of an idea in the first place.
The Navy is interested in getting the ball rolling for the Super Hornet’s replacement, now called the F/A-XX 6th Generation Fighter. This aircraft is supposed to be fielded sometime in the 2030s as the Super Hornets will be meeting their design life limits at around that time. Sounds great right? Well it really is not.
The reality is that if the Joint Strike Fighter is to continue on, and it almost certainly will, the Navy and the Marines are the ones who will benefit the most from it. They will both be able to forward deploy stealth assets for the first time to any trouble spots around the globe with ease via their floating carriers and helicopter docks. Further, the F-35C will give the US Navy the first day of war punch that was originally promised to them via the A-12 Avenger some 20 years ago. Additionally, the F-35C/Super Hornet combo really will complement each other nicely on CVN decks. Otherwise, if the USN cancelled the F-35 and bought more Super Hornets in the meantime and waited till the mid to late 2030s for their dreamy 6th generation superfighter as proposed, they would basically make their prized super carriers irrelevant in the coming decade and beyond, and irrelevant is not a good thing to be when it comes to making the case for continued funding of these floating cities that basically burn cash like diesel.
We know the LCS concept is both controversial and marred with strange capability gaps and quality control issues, but the piece linked above, written by Michael Fabey over at Aviation Week, really gives us a raw view into this troubled program. The article mainly deals with the USS Freedom (LCS-1), but the conceptual issues with the Littoral Combat Ship also spill into the USS Independence (LCS-2)/Independence Class as well, although there are capability differences between them. The fact that there are two distinct variants of the LCS concept also begs the question: If one class is riddled with structural and availability issues why not just build the alternative class alone? Do we really need two types of a ship this size that cannot even be used for air defense or large-scale offensive strike? The Navy should just pick the better of the two and be happy that the whole Littoral Combat Ship initiative has not been cancelled in full, as it’s utility and innovation seems to be decreasing as the validity of its original concept of operation and construction erode.
I have to be honest here, I have never been a fan of the LCS concept. Like the Joint Strike Fighter, it forces a lot of varied capabilities into a single under-engineered system that seems to miss the whole picture of what a “fighting ship” should be. Why not just build, license, or purchase an Perry Class sized frigate with room for a couple interchangeable mission modules, a small vertical launch system for air defense and ground attack missiles, and a ramp at the back for special forces to drive their rigid inflatable boats up onto while the ship is underway? Does 20kts of speed really matter that much in this day and age of over the horizon warfare, anti-ship missiles, and aerial attack? Are the LCSs really planning on going into “battle” using their speed? It sounds so archaic. They are massive targets for goodness sake not fast attack cigarette boats!
It seems like the US Navy needs a multi-mission fighting frigate and instead they have built a militarized ferry with minimal survivability or offensive punch. Why not just build a good all around frigate for missions that do not require an AEGIS cruiser and purchase cheaper ferry derived craft such as the “Sea Fighter” for true littoral warfare tasks?
A domestic alternative to the LCS is Ingalls Shipyard’s surface combatant variant of the National Security Cutter currently in service with the US Coast Guard. This ship concept is named the Patrol Frigate 4501/4921. The Patrol Frigates would feature lower operating costs and a more traditional approach to ship design to lower risk. Many of the same systems that are featured on the LCS would be included in the Patrol Frigate, including a large flight deck and hangar, missionized equipment areas, and launch and recovery ramp for special boat operations on the stern, but it would also boast a 3D air defense radar and 12 to 24 cell vertical launch system for air defense and ground attack missiles. 
The National Security Cutters have been performing very well for the Coast Guard and have proven their worth on a surprisingly large array of missions. Further, studies have been done pitting the Patrol Frigate against the LCS and the results are eye opening. The bottom-line is that Patrol Frigates would bridge the gap between the LCS, Perry Class Frigates that have all but disappeared from US Naval Ports, and the powerful AEIGS class of cruisers and destroyers currently in inventory. Further, it would the Patrol Frigate provides for more robust unitary operations and survivability than the LCS it aims at upstaging.
Just as suggested here recently, Taiwan is realizing that the right jet to survive and prevail against possible Chinese aggression is not the latest model F-16 but the short takeoff and vertical landing variant of the Joint Strike Fighter, otherwise known as the F-35B. Taiwan is really the perfect customer for the F-35B, geographically they are sitting on China’s doorstep and they are strategically focused of dispersed fighter operations due to the threat post by China’s ballistic and cruise missiles. As discussed in the Aviationintel piece linked at the bottom of this post, the F-35B would not only allow Taiwan to field 5th generation stealth technology as a deterrent toward Chinese aggression, but it would also allow them to operate off of small concrete pads, less that 1,000′ in length, instead of large stretches of highway which are still vulnerable to ballistic and cruise missile barrages. Further, the F-35B fits Taiwan’s value of sortie generation and survivability over range and offensive punch. This is a no-brainer for the Obama Administration and would be a huge boost for the F-35 program, and especially the troubled B variant.
I do find it strange that Taiwan would decide to wait for the F-35B when the US Government is currently not even willing to clear the sale of new fourth generation F-16s, an aircraft that we even recently sold Pakistan. Adding insult to injury, the comprehensive upgrade package for their existing F-16A/B fleet that the White House insisted on in lieu of new aircraft was originally quoted at costing some $35M+ per aircraft! This did not even include the high price of testing and integrating a new modular AESA radar into their decades old F-16s, a cost that the USAF, who is planning on upgrading their own F-16′s similarly, would love to pass off on the Taiwanese. The Obama Administration is wrong on this, Taiwan should be able to buy anything they ask for that we already export to similar allies. Further, they should be offered a place at the fragile F-35 table if they are willing to pony up and purchase the jets. The White House’s disconnect on this topic blows my mind as their very own shift in strategic focus pretty much dictates the need for our allies in Pacific region to be armed with the latest and greatest exportable US weaponry so that we don’t have to constantly fill the deterrent role vis-a-vis China. Maybe more importantly, by allowing our allies to arm themselves with 5th generation fighters, if things ever heat up in the region America will have a constantly “deployed” force of highly capable aircraft that can fight alongside our air forces instead of behind them, all at no cost to the US taxpayer.
