THE UK PREPARES FOR THE F-35C, YET MAY OPT FOR THE F-35B ONCE AGAIN
The BBC takes us inside the UK’s F-35 simulator where RAF pilots and industry folks are becoming re-familiarized with “cat & trap” naval aviation. This simulator is pretty outstanding, wouldn’t we all love to get “a golden ticket” for a couple of hours in one?
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-17238393
Meanwhile it seems like the UK’s leap to the F-35C and a catapult and arresting gear configured carrier is very much in doubt. Frankly I was stunned when the MoD made the move from the STOVL F-35B to the conventional F-35C. The Royal Navy had gotten along great with their Harrier Carriers over the last few decades and taking on the massive extra expensive of training their pilots for conventional carrier operations, as well as redesigning their ship (ships really but one of the Queen Elizabeth Class carriers is going to be a reserve ship, or shared, or scrapped, or???) for such a demanding operational environment. Further, if the UK were to do so, why not purchase a mature and affordable strike fighter to begin with before leaping directly to the hugely expensive F-35C? It would seem like purchasing the F/A-18E/F or Rafale in decent numbers would lower risk, costs, and greatly leverage interoperability between allies. When it comes down to it, with all of America’s Pentagon procurement and force structure woes, no country seems to have a shorter attention span, or make more less informed knee-jerk decisions when it comes to these issues than the UK.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-17233867
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JAPAN THREATENS TO AXE THE F-35 IF COSTS BALLOON
This is common sense right? Shouldn’t all the F-35 partner nations have a similar stance?
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/01/us-lockheed-fighter-japan-idUSTRE82001I20120301
MEANWHILE, THE F-35 INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS HAVE MET, DOWNED THEIR ASPIRIN & COOL-AID, AND CAME OUT UNITED BEHIND THE F-35 PROGRAM
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/03/lockheed-fighter-idUSL2E8E2CLL20120303
Something seems awefully fishy about this. US government officials go up to Canada to alleviate partner nations fears about their “Winchester Mystery Jet” and proceed to tell them all about the great progress the program is making. Keep in mind it is absolutely key that the international partners buy a load of these aircraft in order to keep the price down for the DoD, and visa-versa. So it’s almost mutually assured destruction on a massive weapons program level.
So who can you really trust when it comes to the F-35? Lets see, the manufacturer? No way, as its their product, one worth A TRILLION DOLLARS in revenue, and almost everything they have promised has not come to fruition. Can you believe the US government? Well it depends on who you talk to. Someone from the program itself who has a vested interest in seeing it succeed? No way. Frankly, anyone sent up there from the DoD is most likely going to try their best to turn a nightmare into a Disney cartoon, because without the international buyers the DoD pays a lot more per jet. Plus the F-35 is developing into a containment strategy against China. America needs F-35 partner nation’s logistics and basing for future wars, especially considering how finicky a stealthy flying supercomputer is going to be far from home. Finally, what about US Lawmakers? We that is a tough one too, as this is the largest defense program in the history of mankind. Pieces of it are built-in almost every state. Further, the F-35 sounds like a wonder-weapon to anyone who has not studied air combat for years or even decades. Can a small businessperson from Arizona, recently elected Representative, really “cut through” the canned briefings on the program? I doubt it because on paper the F-35 sounds like a winner, and without lots of experience in these matters it appears to have no alternative. In the end the only people that seem critical about the F-35, outside of sheer sticker shock reaction, are those key Congressman who have been on the Armed Services Committee or other related posts for years, or especially those who have served in uniform and can actually understand how this thing fits into America’s future order of battle. So what does all this mean?
What is means is that honestly I don’t think you can trust anyone aside from non-bought defense analysts when it comes to a program that has been deemed “to big to fail” by everyone directly involved. Further, the DoD and Lockheed can say whatever they want really, words are just words, they are cheap and frankly this thing has gotten so big and so many people have so much to gain by it that I think the F-35 “echo chamber” has been galvanized into solid granite, and is impenetrable by anything but hard learned facts and clear, undeniable failures.
The DoD and Congress are inflicting most all of the F-35 pain onto themselves really and have been more of a part of the disease than a symptom of it since the beginning of the flawed JSF philosophy. The ones who really lose here are the partner nations. They will end up with a shrunken to irrelevance fighter fleet that it to expensive to operate and train with and an aircraft that features a compromised airframe that was built to do things that their air forces never required in the first place. Imagine what the F-35A and even the C could be, with all that thrust and techno-wizardry, if the F-35B STOVL requirement was never part of the JSF philosophy in the first place? The jet would have cost much less, probably be operational today, would most likely be stealthier and able to supercruise, and less complicated to maintain.
In other words, pack those same avionics into an airframe where STOVL was never a design factor and you would have a real aircraft to hang the free world’s hat on for the 21st century. In the end the Marine’s requirement poisoned the cake, and no matter how much frosting you put on it it still tastes pretty damn nasty.
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PACOM COMMANDER IS AGAINST AESA RADARS FOR S. KOREA’S F-16s, YET WE ARE WILLING TO SELL THEM THE F-15SE & F-35???
Is this shoddy reporting or am I missing something here? We are willing to sell S. Korea the F-15SE with the mother of all AESAs installed, and the F-35A that supposedly represents the US’s latest tech on many levels, yet we are unwilling to allow the S. Koreans to throw a AESA radar set in their aging Vipers?
http://defense.aol.com/2012/02/28/pacom-chief-balks-at-f-16-upgrades-for-south-korea/
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ANOTHER DECENT PIECE ON ISRAEL’S ABILITY TO STRIKE IRAN
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17115643
It is incredibly convenient for Israel that Iraq has not fielded a fast jet fighter force of any size over the last decade since the US invasion. Once the IAF’s jets get over Jordan they basically have free reign over Iraqi airspace to refuel, regroup etc. Further, Israel may be able to stage a forward deployed search and rescue force in Iraq’s western deserts temporarily while the mission is underway.
It almost seems like for those “on the outside looking in” at the possibility of an Israeli pre-emptive strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities are missing a key ingredient. What do the Israelis have up their sleeve that would make this mission much more feasible that it appears to be? Could it be the secret approval and cooperation of a Sunni Arab country that also has a lot to lose if Iran gets the bomb, like say Saudi Arabia? Or possibly the Mossad has a large clandestine commando force on the ground in Iran that will support such an airstrike via creating havoc on the ground behind enemy lines? Will their Dolphin class submarines sneak into the Persian Gulf and unleash an opening cruise missile barrage on fixed Iranian air defense and other key targets? Maybe some underestimate Israel’s numerous F-16s, equipped with “Popeye Lite” and “Deliluh” air to ground standoff missiles, which may give their F-16′s the additional reach needed to take out all but Iran’s most fortified targets, which will be left for the more capable F-15Is. Who knows, the IAF may even have another, longer range, air to ground standoff missile that we have yet to hear about. Or is Iran’s nuclear program actually less dispersed and resilient than we think?
As I read these articles I am realizing that those who are writing them are not really taking a “combined arms” approach to the problem. Instead they are looking at Israel’s forces in a simplified, “a al carte’” manner. With this in mind I think I am going to begin working on a hypothetical piece that will lend some light to an already tired, yet at the same time a strangely unexplored topic…
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RUSSIA AND CHINA BUY THE MOST ADVANCED SUKHOIS ON THE MARKET
Russia is moving forward with procuring 92 SU-34 “Fullbacks” fighter-bombers. This will give Russia a major upgrade in medium range punch, and will allow the country to retire their aging SU-24s.
http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/moscow-approves-deal-for-92-su-34-bombers-368993/
China is also getting in o
n Sukhoi feeding frenzy with their request to purchase the 4.5 generation Su-35, although details are still scarce. I wonder what Russia thinks of China buying their aircraft then adapting their designs for their own indigenously produced variants? If Sukhoi is still allowed to sell Russia’s latest and greatest operationally capable fighter to China than it would seem that maybe some backroom “understanding” is in place regarding China’s almost seamless unlicensed adaptation of Russian fighter designs.
http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/china-requests-sukhoi-su-35-fighter-buy-368838/
Regarding the carriers, I believe the projected savings were considerable if we went with CATOBAR and the cheaper to buy and maintain F-35C. On its own, that seems like a perfectly good reason to switch, but the Queen Liz is too close to completion to get the new EMAL system apparently, so it’ll cost another billion quid to refit her when the UK’s economy perks up a bit and two carriers doesn’t seem such a burden (or at least that’s what the optimists are saying).
There are still options left that the MoD doesn’t seem to be considering. We could sell the CATOBAR Prince of Wales (to France or India perhaps?) and build a third, we could reactivate a couple of harrier squadrons to fly off the first carrier and then purchase the F-35B when prices fall (mothballing the second ship instead), we could even lease first ship after sea trials to the USN (do they have a need for another V/STOL carrier?)
In regards to an Israeli strike, I would be impressed if they had the ability to deploy a significant ground force in Iran to coordinate strikes, or even just to divert attention from the main attack. The Iranians will have much tighter security on their facilities post-Stuxnet, and I would be very surprised if the Revolutionary Guard didn’t have enough men garrisoned at them to repel a direct assault, though information on their deployments is sparse on the internet.
I seriously doubt that Sunni Arab states would have anything to do with such a raid. They might be anxious about the Iranians getting the bomb, but they’re also in the middle of a region-wide popular democratic movement and would be exposed to a public backlash. There’s no way the Saudis or Jordanians could hide their collusion with Israel to deploy troops across the border, not to mention the fact that these hypothetical commandos would still have to travel through Shia Iraq or across the Gulf in boats to reach Iran. Turkey is a complete no-go considering the current state of relations. The only realistic way a commando team could get there undetected would be to deploy from the Dolphins, or cross the Afgan/Pakistani/Turkmenistan border individually before regrouping nearer their targets. They might even have the help of Iranian dissidents to hide the commandos before the operation.
Perhaps the Mossad has a cyber attack primed to disable telecoms or electricity grid to remove the need for air strikes or cruise missiles on those targets, reserving them for the nuclear sites. There’s the possibility that they’ve managed to sneak in another Stuxnet-esque worm that will help cause confusion prior to the attack, but I doubt it. Whoever pulled the first attack off had the cooperation of Seimans to tailor the worm for products they had manufactured for use in the centrifuges, and was ‘triggered’ by manually infecting a computer. There is no remote method of triggering a cyber attack to coincide with an airstrike. Disabling their JY-14 surveillance radars would be a high priority, though lord knows how they’d do that with either a commando operation or a cyber attack. They’re likely to be well defended and almost certainly isolated from telecommunications and portable mass storage.
The Dolphins have their tomahawks, but they can only carry a max of 16, and I doubt they’d be able to field all three subs at the same time. Usually, only 1 is on patrol at a time. They’ve managed to have two in the Red Sea before, but only for a short period. Their max range is 8000 nmi surfaced, but much less submerged and moving at a decent speed. A one way trip to the Gulf without refuelling would be about 3000 nmi, so to position two there without the Iranians knowing about it is unlikely. They’ll be watching traffic through the Suez as well as the Straits of Hormuz. At best Israel will have 32 tomahawks in range, but more likely 24. I don’t know how much damage they could do with so few, but it seems reasonable to assume they’ll use them to supplement air strikes.
There’s always the possibility of using Jericho 3s with conventional warheads as well, perhaps not against the hardened nuclear facilities, but against softer stationary targets that are integral to Iran’s air defence, or just to create confusion. They’re probably not accurate enough to destroy the hardened facilities with a CEP of something like 50-100m, and such an attack preceding an airstrike would only alert the Iranians.
Will, thanks for comments, some replies:
I cant imagine they thought going to a CATOBAR system would save money, especially when maintaining catapults and arresting gear and training for conventional carrier ops were factored in over the life of the programs.
How could the RAF/RN reactive Harrier squadrons? They have sold them all to the US. Further, going back to the GR9 after building a high-tech 60k ton flattop would be pretty odd.
I think its probably fairly certain that there are a good number of Mossad operatives operating in Iran already. Trickled in over the years it only takes a small size force to cause havoc if they are properly trained and attack in the just the right place. Kind of a death by a thousand cuts sort of thing. Small asymmetric strikes to support the larger mission, through confusion or direct disruption.
I don’t see a large conventional force traveling through Arab lands to get to Iran, they would be trickled in from the north and from the east over time. Where I do see a country like Saudi Arabia playing ball is in basing and staging the IAF for such a raid on one of it’s isolated but sprawling airbases. Even just to work as a divert point or QRF for downed aircraft. Although I do not think full on staging is out of the question. Rumors of this have been rampant over the last couple of years and reported on by major agencies:
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37950730/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/israel-setting-saudi-base-iran-raid/#.T1U1oPnANLU
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3909732,00.html
I think you are totally right. A cyber assault is most certainly part of their plan. “Suter” type technology will be used without a doubt against Iranian IADS.
The Dolphins do not have Tomahawks. They have Israeli developed cruise missiles. Many sources say the largest of the two missiles in service has almost a 1000 mile range. Which means they can hit Tehran from the Gulf of Oman. The Dolphins have 4 huge tubes in addition to their standard Harpoon sized tubes. As a nuclear second strike capability we can assume the Israeli Navy has done everything possible to maximize the reach of these weapons. On refueling, why can’t they just hit a tender out in the Indian Ocean?
Possibly the worry of using ballistic missiles is that Iran will have the precedent to respond with a ballistic missile barrage.
Great thoughts, sorry if there seemed to be all counterpoints here, I just wanted to mention some alternatives.
Ty
Don’t sweat it. I tend to be behind on defence news. For a start, I was under the impression that two RAF squadrons worth of Harrier IIs were still around, but apparently they were sold too :-/
Although it’s unlikely, there’s always the possibility of buying Spanish and Italian harriers. I believe they’re waiting for the F-35 as well. Getting enough pilots to fly them might be a problem even then. The harriers could fly off a flat top as they did off of the Invincibles with the aid of a ramp, which would be much cheaper to fit than gutting the ship to fit the catapult equipment.
Mossad undoubtedly have operatives in Iran, and probably quite a few Iranians working for them as well. My doubt was that Israel could get large numbers of commandos across the border without being spotted, and successfully destroy facilities that are likely to be well guarded. They might be able to plant bombs and add to the confusion, but I think death by a thousand cuts might be an exaggeration; more like aggravation of a hundred scratches.
I wouldn’t consider something like SUTER a win-button though. The Russians got a good look at what it could do in Syria and the Iranians have probably changed the way they integrate their air defence as a result. It won’t be centralised, and you can bet that they’ve looked into firewalling it. They have a larger, higher quality and more varied selection of radar and SAMs so their eggs are not all in one basket. Even if the Israeli SUTER its been upgraded since Syria, it will be less effective over Iran.
Regardless of the missile, the Dolphins are still limited to 16 weapons each, of which some will be torpedoes. Unless Israel has a very specific time frame in mind, they will be realistically limited to only two submarines. They don’t have any sub tenders, just a few coastal support vessels, so they’d be reliant on someone else (The US?) providing the fuel, which would require forewarning. I’m not saying that the Israeli’s won’t use their Popeye Turbos, but they will be in small numbers and would have to risk interception crossing hundreds of kilometres of Iran to reach nuclear facilities from the Indian Ocean. They might be better used as a diversion for the main event.
It is certainly possible that SA would allow such an attack. They denied that they practiced standing down their air defences in 2010, but recently there has been some news about basing there as you suggested (http://www.forbes.com/sites/petercohan/2012/02/26/will-saudi-arabia-support-an-israeli-attack-on-iran-in-june/). My gut feeling is that neither will happen though. The political landscape is very different now, and the credibility of the sources is questionable.
We could consider the pros and cons from a Saudi perspective for allowing or actively aiding Israel in an attack.
Pros:
• They would not be threatened by a future Iranian nuclear arsenal, and would have no reason to develop or purchase their own. With Russia and China overtly taking sides, and the ongoing instability in the region, no one wants to see an arms race between the oil producers.
• Oil prices will rise under any attack scenario, which will mean the Saudis stand to make serious money. They are already filling the gap left by Iran after they preemptively stopped exports to the UK and France.
• A weakened Iran might allow them to increase their influence in Iraq, and so dictate terms on oil production and reduce the Shia influence on its own population.
• They would retain their strategic alliance with the US, and perhaps benefit from this monetarily, with military contracts, or politically in regards to popular protests, worker’s and women’s rights which the USA has remained relatively quiet about.
• They might even gain some sway with Israel and so bring the region closer to a viable peace initiative. This would require the Israelis to consider such cooperation as a favour though, which would be dependent on volatile Israeli domestic politics. Jordan has by far the best relations with Israel in the Arab world, and has zero tangible political influence.
Cons:
• Saudi Arabia might be directly targeted by Iranian missiles, and they are not prepared to defend population centres against such an attack. The Iranians would undoubtedly try to assassinate Saudi politicians and diplomats as they tried to last year.
• They might lose influence in other Arab countries such as Lebanon, Egypt, and Iraq which have new governments who are either friendly towards Iran and/or hostile towards Israel, and which are unstable and reliant on relative calm in the ME for them to consolidate their domestic politics. They might suffer a backlash from the Saudi Shia minority, and potentially from lower class Sunnis as well.
• Saudi oil exports would be threatened by Iran, which would result in losses of revenue. Their oil has to go through the Straits of Hormuz, and Ras Tanura is very exposed to Iranian attacks (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/jun/03/saudiarabia.oil). Saudi Arabia has increased oil production already, so why would they jeopardise that?
Seems to me that they would be better off picking up the slack as Iran feels the sting of sanctions rather than risking their main source of income, their regional relations and their domestic stability.