DEAR USMC: YOU ARE GETTING YOUR F-35B, NOW GET THE VERY MOST OUT OF IT

9614148625_e1aa0ebbb1_kAfter my recent piece about the Navy’s new LHA “America” class of amphibious assault ship’s inadequate thermal protection built into its flight deck, I think it is time for the Marine Corps, and the “Gator Navy,” to get serious about getting the most out of their soon to be fielded F-35B force. The ultra-expensive F-35B, with its unique capability to takeoff and land in short distances, while retaining a decent majority of the conventional F-35A’s range and payload, is really a fantastic capability that makes this particular model of the Joint Strike Fighter the most strategically relevant out of the three variants. With the fielding of the F-35B, the Navy almost doubles its theoretical “first day of war”, fixed wing capable, carrier force. This means that more ships capable of operating high-performance, low-observable, multi-role fighters, can be in more places at a single time. This enhancement to America’s naval power projection capability will complicate the war plans of any potential peer state belligerent, and will result in a highly relevant strategic boost for the US, especially in the dawning age of Air-Sea Battle and the DoD’s “pivot” towards the Pacific theater.

F-35_JSF_variantsThe short takeoff and vertical landing optimized F-35B is so capable because its close relatives, the USAF’s conventional runway operated F-35A and the Navy’s “cat and trap” configured F-35C, paid a huge price aerodynamically and conceptually in order to include the short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) requirement into the F-35′s basic airframe design. In the name of commonality, the F-35B, with its huge box-like central lift fan, along with its complex drivetrain and downward swiveling exhaust nozzle, basically handicapped the aerodynamics, and in essence the very concept, of its more conventional Navy and Air Force brethren. In other words, some would say that the F-35 was built as a STOVL aircraft first, and then adapted to a standard and carrier fighter second, instead of the other way around.

9614147369_f016461ec3_kThe design demands of lifting twenty plus tons, near vertically, on a pillar of thrust are simply so consuming that they compromised the potential performance of the other two less “engineering challenged” F-35 variants. Oddly enough, the Marine’s F-35B order only represents about 14% of the DoD’s total F-35 buy, yet the other 86% of aircraft will handicapped by the F-35B’s unique design requirements. When the JSF’s design was finally locked, the aircraft was left with a massive fuselage cross-section, as well as a single engine with a huge circumference. This, along with many other STOVL related design requirements, gave the more numerous A and C versions of the jet an airframe that is far less than optimal given their basic sub-design’s goals. This  conceptual strategy, known as ”commonality,” was supposed to save money and speed the aircraft’s delivery to the front lines when compared with building two or even three separate primary designs that share avionics subsystems. This “strategy,” one that many predicted was more of a sales ploy than a relevant procurement and design concept, has now been proven to be far less than ideal, and its benefits borders on nil in actuality.

Once you set aside the constant flow of “it’s always sunny in Fort Worth” (where Lockheed builds the F-35) manufacturer propaganda, the stark reality is that if the Joint Strike Fighter program had not been bogged down with the STOVL requirement the Air Force and Navy, and the other nations that are now customers of the F-35, could have likely had a much better fighter. One that is more robust, features better range, super-cruise capability, enhanced payload and much greater agility, and all at a lower price tag. 9628835957_32b788811d_kSo, in the end the Marines will get the finest replacement for their AV-8Bs Harriers that they could have ever wished for, while the USAF, Navy and partner nations (over 90% of the F-35′s entire production run) will get an aircraft that has paid dearly for granting the Marines their golden short takeoff and vertical landing wish.

Now that the DoD is so heavily invested in this flawed design philosophy, and presumably will not cancel the F-35 program as a whole at this point in its “evolution,” the idea of not procuring the most strategically revolutionary model of the lot (F-35B), and the one that the other two more numerous sub-designs will pay a high performance and capability price throughout their design lives for, would be beyond stupid. The fact that some aviation “experts” and DoD big-wigs say we could, or even should, cancel the B model alone is absurd, as we would end up with two compromised designs (the A and the C model) without the unique strategic “payoff” of the third design (the STOVL B model) that made these compromises exist in the first place! The whole situation is really an odd scenario where aerospace design, politics, metrics, conceptual force structure planning and opportunity cost converge, and not in a pretty or organized way.

So with all this in mind, my advice to the “gator navy” and the Marine Corps is to get behind the F-35B in a big way, and this goes far beyond fighting to see that the aircraft is not cancelled and rushing it past an erroneous “initial operational capability” goal line. The Marines need to immediately highlight to the public the strategic opportunity that the F-35B presents to the nation, and prioritize funding to an “ecosystem” of uniquely F-35B centered support infrastructure and force multiplying capabilities that will allow the jet to realize their full potential. In doing so, the F-35B force could positively revolutionize the Marine Expeditionary Strike Group’s utility forever.

110907-N-KD852-132The idea that the F-35B will work like its predecessor, the AV-8B Harrier, on the decks of Navy amphibious assault ships really does not give the aircraft’s attributes the credit they deserve. Deploying a state of the art, low observable, supersonic and highly networked asset like the F-35B in place of the Harrier is like trading in a 1960′s Mustang Cobra for a brand new Corvette. A metaphor that is both accurate in regards to the aircraft’s capability and it’s complexity.

The AV-8B is missionized and tasked as primarily at close air support asset, although the classic jump jet has just received the ability to employ the AIM-120 AMRAAM operationally. Seeing the F-35B in the same light, as primarily a close air support asset, is ridiculous. This aircraft was built to penetrate enemy air defenses and strike at the heart of their ability to wage war via direct attack for low and medium class counter-air environments, and via the use of standoff weaponry for extremely high-threat scenarios. And yes, it can provide close air support as well, but you do not need a stealthy F-35B to do that in the vast majority of foreseeable combat situations. For instance, the probability that we are really going to be landing hundreds, if not thousands of Marines on beaches where we do not have air superiority above their heads is quite low. Such a dire circumstance, especially at first glance, seems to represent a fairly antiquated view of amphibious operations. Even if a lightning fast, over the horizon, sneak beach landing on an enemy’s shore were realized, things like LCACs (Landing Craft Air Cushion), amphibious fighting vehicles and thousands of Marine infantrymen are hardly stealthy. Thus, the F-35B’s ability to leverage the “element of surprise” will be all but eliminated.

450x300_q75dWith this in mind, the question arises, do we really need stealth assets overhead during a beach landing at all?  In a time of emerging long-range precision naval fire support and Helicopter gunships bristling with guided munitions, there are many other, and far cheaper, options for close air support than a relatively short ranged and high-speed stealth fighter. In most circumstances, the F-35B will do the close air support job far better than an upgraded AV-8B Harrier, but where the F-35B’s real talents lie are in its ability to give the Marines and the ”gator navy” much more than just a new high-speed precision close air support platform.

Cruisin’SEAD/DEAD (suppression/destruction of enemy air defenses) ”wild weasel,” advanced counter-air, and electronic attack to some extent, are all capabilities that the Marine Expeditionary Strike Group does not current possess in an organic fashion. Instead, these flotillas would rely on “external assets” to get the job done during a time war. Currently such capabilities are provided by Navy or even Air Force aircraft, such as the F-22 Raptor, Block 50 F-16CM Viper, E/A-18G Growler and so on. With the addition of the F-35B to the Marine’s inventory, varying levels of these capabilities will now be within the Marine Expeditionary Strike Group’s own repertoire. But that is not all the F-35B provides.

For the first time, the Marine Expeditionary Strike Group will have a ship-deployed fixed-wing platform that can provide deep strike, counter air, advanced penetrating reconnaissance and advanced signals intelligence far into highly contested territory. 110517-M-ED643-001In other words, these Marine-centric flotillas will possess the same baseline capabilities as their larger cousins, the Carrier Strike Group will have, although in a lower density format. Also, whereas the F-35B’s ability to deliver close air support during a traditional beach landing is less than unique, its ability to do so while operating within the outer “spheres” of inland enemy surface to air missile batteries is. Also, with the F-35B, the Expeditionary Strike Group may not land on a beach at all during a ground assault. Instead, they may insert forces deep behind enemy lines for pinpoint raids, in which case the F-35B would potentially be able to operate in a DEAD/Jamming role to “clear the way” for MV-22 Ospreys, while also providing offensive counter air and close air support duties for the mission. In effect, with the F-35B, the ESG is no longer beholden to coastal assaults against enemy’s with capable air defense systems. Paired with the MV-22 Osprey’s range and speed, against certain foes, the ESG can put hundreds of miles on inland territory under direct threat, both from the air and the ground.

Because of the fielding of the F-35B, the Expeditionary Strike Group can now transform into a “first day of war” force, capable of operating independently of the USAF and a nuclear powered aircraft carrier deployed air wing, even against a formidable foe. An ESG will now be able to provide its own highly capable combat air patrols, its own destruction of enemy air defenses, its own penetrating airborne reconnaissance, and its own manned deep strike capabilities. Simply put,050917-N-2382W-114 F-35B breaks the ESG’s dependencies on multitude of external assets, many of which will be already taxed to the limit during a serious conflict against a credible peer state foe which may occur over a vast theater. No longer will close proximity land bases or massive aerial “tanker bridges” for USAF F-22s or F-16s be a mission breaking issue for an ESG. And most importantly, traditional Carrier Strike Groups, and their massive air wings, can be decoupled from the expeditionary strike group during operations against a serious threat. In effect, the F-35B not only gives the Expeditionary Strike Group a major capability boost, but by giving the ESG operational independence it also boosts America’s “total force” far more than the sum of its parts. F-35 Departs for First Training MissionHigh value assets that would traditionally be needed to work in conjunction with an ESG against a hardened enemy will be free to go other places and do other things. One of these things is simply staying home, thus saving precious airframe time and cost.

Once the F-35B is in service, and considering the unique air, sea and land forces that Marine Expeditionary Strike Group and its flotilla provides, many smaller engagements will be able to be handled without a huge and costly Carrier Strike Group’s presence. Thus, giving much greater flexibility to commanders who may have to deal with multiple missions, in multiple theaters, at a single time. Additionally, because the ESG now has an aircraft capable of surviving in denied airspace, America’s contribution to coalition operations, where the majority of the air combat force may not be supplied by the US, no longer dictates expensive USAF or nuclear carrier deployments. Once again, this saves money, fleet hours and also lower’s America’s geopolitical ”exposure” to such an operation.2007_03_03_lhd5 role fighter’s first day of war, “door kicking down” capabilities.

Currently, ESG’s often deploy “helicopter heavy,” where an LHD’s composite air wing is mainly made up of AH-1s, UH-1s, MV-22s and CH-53s, with only six Harriers included. Although this is common, it is in no way a rigid rule. Depending on the operation at hand, a LHD, and soon an LHA, is able to mix and match its air wing inventory at a commander’s will. During multiple conflicts these flattops have been used as “Harrier Carriers,” where dozens of the jump jets were packed aboard for sustained operations. The F-35B will make this concept even more relevant with its ability to accomplish a full range of missions, including taking the first shots of a conflict, in effect tearing down the surface to air missile, enemy aircraft and sensor network barriers so that other, less survivable aircraft can eventually operate over enemy territory in a safer manner. The new LHA “America” class of amphibious assault ships was built with just this in mind, doing away with the traditional well deck to carry a larger air wing with more fuel and munitions stores. Some concepts exist where a pair of amphibious assault ships work together within a single, albeit larger, ESG. One carrying a couple dozen F-35Bs and the other carrying a few dozen helicopters. Such a concept would allow for a continuous F-35B presence over the battlefield, and would even allow for the ESG to mount fixed wing “alpha strikes,” where the majority of the F-35B force prosecutes a set of strategic enemy targets, much like a Navy carrier air wing currently is capable of.  Harrier-CarrierAn ESG configured in this manner is in many ways even more capable than a nuclear carrier deployed air wing as it also retains an incredibly powerful ground assault capability. This ability to ”surge” assets and integrate them directly into a single ESG represents a true multirole flotilla, able to flexibly threaten any foe within hundreds of miles of the ocean, not just via air strikes but also via amphibious assault.

Seeing as the F-35B has the potential to almost double America’s “first day of war” carrier footprint, a great thing in a time when the nuclear carrier force will most likely continue to shrink, and it will it allow an ESG to operate much more independently than ever before, the Marine’s have to look seriously at maximizing this game changing technology. In order to really get the most out of the F-35B fleet, the Marines and Navy must be willing to aggressively invest in tailored capabilities that will enable this aircraft to reach its true potential and thus maximize the ESG’s utility. If the measures laid out below are taken, a Marine-centric flotilla, with embarked F-35Bs, should be able to operate as a smaller carrier strike group on its own, even against a robustly equipped foe. All without having to deploy throngs of land based tactical, or even possibly strategic aircraft, and/or a nuclear aircraft carrier, to the same area of operations for support.

f35b_bf2refuel_pax_201001071.) Field aerial refueling “tanker” capability for the V-22 Osprey- The F-35B, although it possess superior range over the AV-8B Harrier it replaces, still only possess a combat radius of around 450 miles. Although this is the plague of many modern fighter designs, for a low density, high demand asset, like the F-35B, more fuel is a must. Buddy tanking, using an F-35B to refuel another F-35B, will eventually be possible, but there are diminishing returns when it comes to using one high performance and fuel hungry jet to tank a another high performance and fuel hungry jet. Also, F-35 buddy refueling will require one asset to fly with external tanks and a “hose and drogue” refueling pod, which would leave that aircraft vulnerable due to its external stores compromising its low observable attributes. In a time of growing surface to air missile engagement envelopes and the proliferation of airborne early warning aircraft around the globe, this is not the best scenario. The F-35B’s ability to gain the element of surprise is among its greatest strengths, giving this up for a few thousand pounds of gas would be a shame.

When it comes to aerial refueling, the F-35B is an inefficient way of enhancing the type’s on station time or striking range, as only limited amounts of gas are actually available for offload as the tanker F-35B reaches it’s own combat radius limits. Adding external tanks helps, but the drag from these tanks and their weight diminishes the net fuel increase they offer. There also remains the question of how much weight can the F-35B haul off of a LHD or LHA? A full fuel load, large external drop tanks, and a buddy refueling pod may simply be outside of the aircraft’s STOVL launch envelope.  Another factor to consider when it comes to the possibility of an organic tanking capability for ESGs is that during normal deployments as little a six F-35Bs will be embarked aboard Navy ”amphibs.” Of these six aircraft, at least a couple will be down for maintenance at any given time, especially during sustained operations. Thus, using a F-35B to tank a F-35B will vastly suffocate the available use of these assets for tactical missions.

v22_refuelingThe V-22 Osprey’s tilt-rotor technology may offer a fantastic synergistic capability when paired with the F-35B. Currently, Bell/Boeing is testing a drogue system deployed from the rear ramp of an MV-22. This system is said to have up to 12k pounds of fuel to offload, although this number will certainly increase as the system evolves. Even if half that amount of gas is available under normal operating conditions, the MV-22 would be useful as a recovery tanker, for refueling F-35Bs returning from missions, or as a tanker that will give an F-35B a couple hundred miles extra gas before “fencing in” to enemy territory. The MV-22′s ability to forward deploy on various platforms, such as the stealthy DDG-1000 “Zumwalt” Class Destroyer, or even the Littoral Combat Ship, may allow for a pre-positioned “KV-22″ configured Osprey Tanker to be right under a group of F-35B’s enroute to their targets. Under such a circumstance, the MV-22 could offer the maximum offload potential to these jets as their transit times from their base of operations to offloading their fuel would be measured in tens of miles, not hundreds. Osprey-and-F-35B1With careful mission planning, MV-22 tankers positioned along an F-35B’s flight path could almost double the jump jet’s range with a single tanking evolution. Such a scenario would allow the F-35B to fly a combat radius close to 1000 miles, which may be necessary in order to keep America’s carriers, both nuclear and conventional, out of the enemy’s striking distance.

I would argue that rapidly developing the Osprey as a tanker, and increasing its fuel-offload potential, while also planning to forward deploy them along the F-35B’s interdiction route, should be an absolute priority for the USMC. In fact, this should already have been a priority as the existing AV-8B Harrier fleet suffers from a much more acute range issue than the F-35B ever will. Even if the F-35B were to miraculously get cancelled, the Marines, and their existing AV-8B Harriers, would be better off as they would finally have a way to organically in-flight refuel their jump jets in and around the proximity of the Expeditionary Strike Group.

v22aew2.) Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft- Currently the E-2C/D Hawkeye provides AEW&C and airborne networking relay functions for the Carrier Strike Group with outstanding results. The aircraft’s ”big radar picture,” and its ability to work as an airborne networking node, is invaluable. The F-35B, even with its fantastic avionics and networking capability, along with the ESG’s AEGIS equipped cruiser and/or destroyer companions, are highly capable, but a persistent standoff AEW&C capability would really be a huge plus to the ESG and the F-35B during operations. This is especially true in cases where Navy or Air Force AWACS/AEW&C aircraft, such as the E-3 Sentry, or E-2 Hawkeye, are not available. Additionally, having an advanced radar perched high above, or forward of the ESG, will allow for enhanced detection and engagement of aerial threats, including subsonic and high-speed cruise missiles.

v22-1The V-22 Osprey, with its enhanced range and loiter capability over classical rotary wing assets, would be a great choice for the AEW&C role. Modifying the V-22 with “conformal” electronically scanned arrays, a dorsal radar array, or even a drop down radome for the Osprey’s rear ramp are all potential avenues to retrofit such a capability. Additionally, the Osprey, in its current state, has ample interior volume for more fuel, electronics, and radar control officers. Another option would have the radar operators situated remotely, on one of the ESG’s surface combatants, and the info gained from a ”EV-22″ Osprey beamed down for interpretation and exploitation in real-time via data-link.

S309493984uch an asset, loitering high above the ESG, could also deliver a beyond line of sight “active-net” over the battlefield. Such a system, would have the ability to fuse and rebroadcast various platforms’ sensor pictures via data link. This would greatly enhance the situational awareness of all the ESG’s players’ “picture” of the battlespace, which is a huge force multiplier. If a Osprey configured in this manner utilized powerful AESA arrays for its AEW&C function, the EV-22 Osprey could also potentially be used for standoff pinpoint electronic attack, giving the stealthy F-35B the additional coverage it needs to operate within hotly contested airspace. Finally, such a system need not be a single role capability. Depending on the type of radar used and its processing power, moving target indicator (MTI) functions could also be added for times when air defense is not of the utmost importance. This capability would be an obvious advantage for Marine ground operations, as a “EV-22″ could “call out” enemy mechanized, and even foot soldier movements from many miles away. Under certain circumstances, this capability can also be used for detecting small boat movements in the littorals of areas of interest. In addition to MTI capability, high quality “synthetic aperture” radar pictures could be taken of enemy beach and inland territories in preparation for a beach landing or a strike, whether it be by precision naval gunfire, F-35B or BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missile attack.

9617383748_c83e6b9ffd_k3.) Fortify the deck of the Navy’s Amphibious Assault Ships- Our amphibious assault ships need to be able to handle the F-35B’s hot exhaust during high tempo operations. It is crazy to think that the Marines are going to procure hundreds and hundreds of expensive F-35Bs, yet the very aircraft carriers they are supposed to operate from during expeditionary deployments cannot sustain their use over long intervals of time.

Under the current situation, not only will all of the prior LHD “Wasp” class of ships have issues with deck heating from sustained F-35B and MV-22 operations, but the very ship that was tailor built for these aircraft, the new $6B LHA ”America” class, and which gave up its ability to launch Marine landing craft from its stern in the process, will also be similarly effected (more on this issue here). The Navy says future ships will not have this issue, but they also made this claim about the USS America long ago.  6831893177_24ee905c20_oAdditionally, when the F-35B was in its early developmental stages, the Navy and Lockheed Martin downplayed the possibility that there would be deck related thermal issues from the F-35B’s hot exhaust. Sadly, and as many have predicted, the contrary was proven to be quite true.

Solving this issue should be a top priority for the US Navy and especially the USMC. They should treat this as a mini-Apollo project and work with cutting edge material science firms to find a retrofittable solution. Otherwise, the idea that during certain missions the F-35B could be deployed aboard an amphibious assault ship in large numbers, and thus a Marine Expeditionary Strike Group could truly be used as a smaller Carrier Strike Group, could fall apart. SHIP_LPD-17_USS_San_Antonio_lgYou need to be able to operate fixed wing fighter aircraft continuously during a time of war, especially during a unpredictable conflict against a serious peer-state competitor. It is just sad, and embarrassing really, to think that a potential strategic force multiplier, and a very expensive one at that, like the F-35B would be handicapped because the carriers it is supposed to operate from literally cannot take their heat.

Non-flattop Navy ships that directly support the Marine’s mission, such as the San Antonio Class LPD and sea basing platforms, should be examined for similar deck modifications to allow for potential “lily padding” F-35B operations, or to be used as a forward arming and refueling point for these aircraft. It is very unlikely that an air to ground munitions laden F-35B could vertically depart an LPD’s deck with full fuel, but an F-35B in counter-air configuration (with four internal AIM-120 AMRAAMS, later potentially six) may be able to accomplish a near vertical takeoff with a relevant fuel load. originalIf an Osprey tanker were fielded, a weapons laden F-35B could takeoff vertically with minimal fuel, and top off via KV-22 once safely airborne. With this in mind, Combat Air Patrols, or long-range surveillance missions could greatly benefit from this refueling capability and would allow for a marine flotilla to once again operate more independently of direct USAF and Carrier Strike Group support. Because of the low-frequency of operations from these ”non carrier” ships, it may be that no additional thermal protection will be needed at all, although certainly modifications related to the F-35B’s powerful pillar of thrust will be needed to make these ships suitable for STOVL operations.

320px-F-35_Engine4.) Purchase and deploy plenty of spare F-135-PW-600 STOVL engines- Currently, the F-35B’s engine is so large it will not fit inside the cabin of a MV-22B Osprey. Considering how incredibly complex these motors are, and how far they operate on the edge of their envelope, the Expeditionary Strike Group should be stocked with plenty of spares so that sustained operations are not curtailed because the logistics train may end at the shoreline.

The MV-22 can sling load the F-35′s motor during ideal weather conditions, although this mode of delivery will greatly limit the MV-22s potential range, which is not a good thing when the vast Pacific theater is supposedly the Defense Department’s future focus. Additionally, regularly sling loading a fragile $20M+ state of the art jet motor may not be the best idea. F135-PW-600_FullSo, with this in mind, the USMC has to come to terms with the fact that ample spares need to be embarked aboard LHD/LHAs before they, or their logistical ship companions, leave port. Although such a proposition is very costly, especially considering that a single F-35B motor, drivetrain and lift fan cost almost as much as an entire Harrier years ago, the opportunity cost of having precious F-35B airframes sitting in a hangar deck without a working power plant, especially during a time of war, is much greater. This is especially true during times when LHDs sail with only half a dozen F-35Bs embarked.

kc130-f35c-dual-in-flight-refueling-5Buying plenty of spare engines, at tens of millions of dollars a pop, is no small requirement during these tight fiscal times. Yet in order to get the very most out of the F-35B we must invest in curing its known logistical ills before they become an issue, not after. Although it is not glamorous, having a smaller fleet of fighters but plentiful spare parts, no matter what they cost, is better than fielding a larger overall fleet that is constantly under availability pressure due to insufficient spare parts procurement. Even worse, using an existing fleet as a spare parts bin, known as cannibalization, a custom that is becoming all to prevalent in cash strapped modern air forces, is simply not acceptable, and the practice would be a terrible stewardship of the US tax payers’ dollars. If you are going to fund the jet then you need to fund the extra parts needed to keep them flying while embarked on expeditionary operations, even if this includes a multitude of entire propulsion systems, it is as simple as that.

Emerald Warrior 2012 5.) Outfit a number of MV-22s specifically for high-risk Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) duties- The F-35B has just about the latest in manned deep strike capabilities available. Considering that it could potentially penetrate hundreds of miles into defended enemy territory, it would make sense that the Expeditionary Strike Group would need to be prepared to pluck a downed aircrew out of an enemy’s clutches, should one go down. Currently, the Marine’s version of the Osprey, the MV-22B, lacks the terrain following radar, advanced navigational avionics, top of the line electronic warfare suite, advanced infra-red countermeasures system, and cutting edge communication capability that may be required to successfully retrieve a F-35B pilot shot down over enemy territory. Luckily and answer to this issue already exists in the form of the Air Force’s CV-22B special operations configured Osprey. The USMC should procure a couple dozen of these modified airframes and deploy at least a trio to every Expeditionary Strike Group should a F-35B pilot’s worst case scenario become a reality.

CV-22The loss of one pilot is bad enough, sending many more aircrew and soldiers into densely defended airspace guarded by an integrated air defense system, that would be on extremely high alert, is a huge risk that requires the best assets available to achieve the best possible outcome. I have discussed this situation to a much greater degree in a recent piece about the HH-60G Pave Hawk replacement saga. Seeing that soon the Marines will have the ability to strike deep into the heart of enemy via the F-35B, they should retain the proper combat search and rescue platforms that could actually pluck its pilot to safety that deep into “Indian Country.” During times of deployment, these specialized aircraft could work just as any Osprey does, and would offer an enhanced “missionizes” airframe for embarked MARSOC (MARine Special Operations Command) units to train with or use during high-risk missions.

24th-meu-to-haitiAlthough the F-35B features a low observable airframe, optimized to stay invisible from certain angles and to certain radar bandwidths, and is equipped with the latest in electronic warfare and situational awareness aiding avionics, it is not invincible by any means. It will be not if, but when, in regards to losing an F-35B over enemy territory. Considering that the USAF has already paid dearly for developing a platform incredibly well suited for the CSAR mission, and one that the Marines fly in a simpler format by the hundreds, it would be shameful if the USMC did not procure some CV-22s for their own use. It is a pretty hard sell to Marines flying standard Ospreys, and the troops that will go along for the mission inside them, that a $150M stealth super fighter could not survive over the same territory that they are about to attempt to infiltrate in search of its pilot. At least give these brave folks the best tool necessary to get the job done. The current MV-22B simply is not it.

Joint Common Missile6.) Rapidly integrate small and micro sized munitions into the F-35B’s arsenal- One of the sacrifices that the F-35B pays for its STOVL capability, aside form lugging around a huge lift-fan that is only used for takeoff and landing, is that its weapons bays are smaller than those of the F-35A or F-35C. The B model can pack a 1000lb class weapon and an AMRAAM in each bay, as opposed to the A and C versions which can fit a much large 2000lb class weapon and AMRAAM in each of their bays. This is all fine and good, but for many missions, weapons in measured in thousands, or even hundreds of pounds, are simply overkill. Smaller munitions that can be modified for internal carriage within the F-35′s bays, like the MBDA SABER and the Lockheed Joint Air to Ground Missile, allow for precision strikes against vehicles, small buildings and enemy combatants at a fraction of the weight, and especially volume, of the common 500lb laser or GPS guided bomb.

Even munitions currently in service, such as the sub 50lb class Griffon small tactical munition, should be aggressively fielded as the F-35B does not feature an internal cannon, and the last 10 plus years of war have proven that sometimes only precision targeted direct fire from a cannon is acceptable when troops are in very close combat with the enemy. f-35b-invertedThe F-35B will feature a detachable ventral gun pod, but this system will increase the aircraft’s radar cross section and it only houses a fairly small amount of ammunition. Sub-50lb smart munitions, if developed to be housed within the F-35′s weapons bay, will go a long way at replacing a cannon’s ability to surgically attack an enemy force in close contact with allied troops, multiple times over.

Not only do these weapons offer more flexibility and especially more “attacks” per sortie, while maintaining the jet’s low observable nature, but they could also allow the F-35B to potentially operate in vertical lift mode from tight forward operating locations and ships. Such operations are even more feasible if an Osprey tanker is also fielded and forward deployed near, or with, the F-35B. The F-35B could takeoff vertically with a weapons bay full of lightweight munitions and a small amount of gas, and immediately refuel via a tanker configured MV-22. Such a synergistic capability would allow for incredible flexibility of operations, would help improve the F-35B’s range limitations, and would make it very challenging for the enemy predict and to target the aircraft’s base of operations.

mdba-saberSmall munitions also have their clear advantages when it comes to targeting not just close air support oriented targets, such a vehicles or enemy formations, or when striking targets in densely populated areas where collateral damage is unacceptable. In the past, things like airfields required massive armadas of tactical aircraft to destroy. Even in the modern days of precision guided munitions, each aircraft would have one, or maybe two targets, of which until the advent of GPS guided munitions, each aircraft would have to manually target each of these objectives using their laser designators. In the not so distant future, if small guided munitions are quickly integrated with the F-35B, just a handful of F-35s could do the job that once required an entire carrier air wing, if not more.

Loading a dozen or so small GPS guided munitions onto a small force of F-35Bs, and programming them individually with each target located around an enemy airfield, could potentially allow for wholesale destruction of the entire objective. The F-35Bs, loaded with their targeting information before the mission is launched, would automatically release each small bomb or missile in specified order, at the right location, on a single pass over the target area, allowing for the jet’s weapons bay doors to be opened the minimal amount of time. So instead of say two, or even four targets being destroyed per aircraft assigned to the mission, a dozen or more may be struck on a single pass, by each aircraft. In other words, no longer do you need to prioritize just the most pressing “primary” targets for attack, and then send multiple waves of aircraft to hit each individual aircraft or armored personnel carrier scattered around the target. Instead, a relatively small force of stealthy aircraft can not only hit the base’s runways and hardened structures with heavier munitions, but every other thing of military value sitting around the field could be destroyed efficiently as well. When combined with cruise missile attacks on known surface to air missile sites surrounding the hypothetical enemy airfield, just a half-dozen or so F-35Bs could not only crater the airbase’s runway, but also take out 16 hardened structures, and 32 small structures, aircraft or vehicles, all on a single sneak pass (2X F-35B with 2 1000lb penetrating bombs each, 2X F-35B with 8 SDB each, 2X F-35B with 16 small guided munitions each).

CudaThe F-35B will not only benefit from smaller, lighter munitions for just its air to ground mission set. Currently, Lockheed is quietly working on the “Cuda” air to air, hit to kill, missile. By removing the warhead from the air to air missile concept, the F-35 will be able to carry as much as double, if not triple its current internal air to air loadout. Additionally, a CUDA type concept would allow for a missile that is lighter and more maneuverable than traditional medium range air to air missiles. These properties should allow the Cuda to be used as an internally stored and effective short-range air to air missile as well, something that the F-35 is currently lacking. Under many circumstances, the F-35′s low observable and advanced situational awareness capability will allow it to engage targets at shorter ranges without being detected. Thus a larger arsenal of weapons carried in stealth mode may be a priority over carry much fewer weapons that feature longer range. 130827-F-oc707-001By mixing and matching internal air to air loadouts, such as carrying a pair of long-range AIM-120Ds and eight Cudas, the F-35B would be able to engage numerous targets, both larger and small, and from long to close-intermediate range.

In short, pairing the F-35B with “legacy” munitions is far from ideal. The aircraft needs to be tactically elevated via the rapid integration of smaller, more flexible weaponry. This is especially true considering the B model is supposed to be focused on close air support for Marine’s in combat. Having to quickly return to base after a coupe of air to ground weapons are exhausted is bewildering misuse of this unique and expensive asset. There is no way around it, if the F-35B has the ability to give the Marine Expeditionary Strike Group revolutionary capabilities, then it needs revolutionary weaponry to go along with it, and bulky old bombs and missiles, that were largely intended to be used on aircraft with only external mounting capabilities, simply won’t do.

various_67.) Begin serious research and development for a stealthy STOVL UCAV Although this is not necessary in the short-term, a short takeoff and vertical landing unmanned combat air vehicle would be an incredibly useful tool to work in addition to, and alongside, the limited numbers of F-35Bs deployed with a classically configured Expeditionary Strike Group. On the high-end, something akin to Lockheed’s VARIOUS concept would allow the Expeditionary Strike Group to save the F-35B fleet for specific and targeted operations, while still providing intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), and even light strike capabilities over denied airspace without risking a pilot. Additionally, a VARIOUS like UCAV could operate in a “tethered” fashion to F-35Bs (see #7 of Tyler’s Ten Thoughts On The Future Of Drone Warfare). The reality is that most tactical air combat missions do not require a F-35B, but some are also too risky for a manned AH-1 Cobra, or require more endurance than either of these attack platforms possess. This is where such a system would be of great value. Speed was once the measuring stick for not just a tactical aircraft’s survivability, but also its utility. Now persistence is the name of the game, and a VARIOUS like STOVL UCAV concept would give the ESG such a capability when it is needed.

1342123018577Although a STOVL UCAV operating from the expansive decks of the Navy LHD/LHAs would be a great start, this same concept could be potentially fielded aboard San Antonio Class amphibious transport docks, or even smaller Littoral Combat Ships and other surface combatants. In essence, this would give all these ships incredible “over the horizon,” survivable ISR and light strike capabilities. In many ways, such a system would also be complimented by the Navy’s blossoming MQ-8 Fire Scout unmanned helicopter program. In such a scheme the Fire Scout would be used for lower end, closer in tasks, while the STOVL UCAV would be a higher-end capability, for use over greater ranges, at faster speeds, and against more ”uncooperative” targets. Packed with a few AMRAAMs or even ASRAAMs (AIM-9x would work but its range is limiting), such a UCAV could also provide rudimentary air defense for the more meager of surface combatants, such as the Littoral Combat Ship, which currently lack any organic standoff air defense capability.

384e3265-8b8c-4596-898a-602ea9e0f133_LargeIn essence, a low observable STOVL UCAV would help take the pressure off of the F-35B fleet embarked with Expeditionary Strike Group flotillas, and could serve in many roles, from checking the IDs of commercial ships to dropping munitions on the enemy in support of Marines deployed on shore. Such a system’s uses would be plentiful, and paired with the F-35B, it could fill in the last element of near parity between the Expeditionary Strike Group and its much larger brother, the Carrier Strike Group, who will see a fighter sized UCAV come online operationally in the coming decade.Excalibur-Armed-UAV_large Yet even a more rudimentary, smaller and lighter STOVL UAV would be well worth pursuing. Something that can haul a payload or sensor system high enough and/or far enough to provide a serious return on investment for the ESG. A system such as Aurora Flight Sciences “Excalibur” could fill such a capability gap. The jump-jet UAV could be evolved to be both simple and capable, with estimated cruising speeds up to 400kts, and the ability to loiter for hours on end at a much lower speed. Such a weapon system, although not nearly as capable as a VARIOUS like concept, could help bridge the gap between the entry of the F-35B into true war ready status, and the time it would take to make something like VARIOUS an operational reality.

In conclusion…

F-35B-620x336Currently, the Marine’s almost myopic focus on just trying to get the F-35B off the chopping block seems to have limited their imagination as to how the aircraft could, and should, be employed. It seems that the USMC envision the F-35Bs as being used much like the Harrier force it replaces was, at least to the public at this point, which is a total waste of the aircraft’s advanced capability. Sure, over time combat doctrine, weapons and support infrastructure can be developed and improved upon, but spending tens of billions just to get similar, albeit more survivable, capabilities out of a $150M asset that an already paid for $30M asset (AV-8B Harrier II) provided before hand is ridiculous. Each flight hour is precious on these incredibly expensive machines, why limit those hours’ return on investment because of lack of creativity and fiscal prioritization?

F-35B-in-Wasp-hangarIf we know that an aircraft can be so much more capable than it currently is just by fielding ”low density-high value” supporting weapon systems, as well as infrastructure and weapons improvements, doesn’t it make sense to invest in these areas in a rapid fashion? Especially as these items will cost just a fraction of the F-35B’s total fleet cost, but will make that fleet so much more valuable to America. I would posit that it is better to have a smaller fleet by 20%, but one with a tailored supporting “ecosystem” of the unique improvements discussed above funded in full. Sadly, in an era where the most advanced fighter in US inventory, the F-22A Raptor, packs around Sidewinders designed in the 1980′s due to the lack of helmet mounted sight, a system that is found even on Air National Guard F-16s, and our newest DDG-1000 stealth destroyer lacks missiles that ships built 30 years ago are fielded with in mass, and thus cannot provide area air defense, it would seem that such common logic rarely prevails in the halls of the Pentagon.

OspreyJSFWasp1Although budgets are tight, the chance at expanding America’s “first day of war” aircraft carrier force by almost double the hulls is a prospect worth investing in. In fact, if the F-35 program is to continue, getting strongly behind the F-35B in particular is absolutely necessary as the rest of the US F-35 fleet, some 2100+ jets in total, will pay the acquisition, operating, and performance penalty that the STOVL capable F-35B taxed from their design potential. Getting the most out of a jet that incurred so much opportunity cost to the rest of the services’ fast jet inventory is not only “good business,” it is strategically imperative.

If the Marines do have similar plans for the F-35B as those listed in this article then they should do a much better job of publicizing them, and explaining just how much impact the F-35B can have on America’s “total expeditionary force.” Justifying the aircraft in a similar light as the rest of the F-35 stable does the B model a great disservice and does not underline how these $150M jets are investment for our nation that is greater than the sum of its parts. 1190611000One would be hard pressed to argue the same in regards to the much more numerous, but questionably relevant, F-35A and C models.

In the end it may not be good for the USAF or the Navy, but the Marines have gotten the jet of their dreams, and at very high cost. It is now time to make the most out of America’s massive monetary and opportunity cost investment, as it makes no sense to spend over $50B on “revolutionary” stealth jump jets if the assets that support them, the infrastructure for which they are deployed from, and the weapons they carry, remain fiscally locked in the distant past…

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12 Responses to DEAR USMC: YOU ARE GETTING YOUR F-35B, NOW GET THE VERY MOST OUT OF IT

  1. CharleyA says:

    The notion of using LHA/Ds as an aviation force multiplier is flawed for a number of reasons – too many to cover here. Anyway, the larger America class will normally embark six fixed wing aircraft, as does the LHD. At any time, at least one aircraft will be down for mx- that leaves one division available for operations. One section would be used for FAD, the other section for strike, and the last ready on deck as a spare. Hardly a potent force for anything other than rescuing downed aviators or supporting an embassy under siege.

    One could argue that a LHA fixed-wing aircraft complement could be increased to 20 or so, but that is at the expense of other aircraft – so their goes the rescue mission (and any MV-22 refuelers.) Plus, the mx spaces probably are not going to be able to support 20 aircraft anyway. Changing an engine / lift fan aboard has not been demonstrated as of yet, and it will take a lot of hanger space to do so (the engine is removed from the rear, not from above as in the Harrier – and it is BIG.) Then there is the need to keep the aircraft clean to maintain stealth…

    Some think tanks have recommended replacing CVNs with LHAs, arguing that they are about 1/3 – 1/4 the cost of the Ford class CVN. Again, the normal complement of LHAs are six aircraft, which is about half the size of a Navy squadron, and a CVN usually embarks four squadrons of strike fighters, for about 48 F/A-18s (or F-35Cs.) And the CVN could plus up to six squadrons in a crisis because they are designed for that number of aircraft. Given the cost of escorts for multiple LHAs to equal the striking power – and the speed and robustness – of a CVN, the argument does not hold water.

    Anyway, the Marines are the winners of the JSF program – the design was optimized for their needs. But “winning” leads to a lot of complicated operational issues that may turn out to be more limiting than expansive.

    • aviationintel.com says:

      Charley, I understand your concerns and directly addressed them in the piece, and consulted sources that have direct experience with “enhanced” STOVL operations aboard LHDs. Please have another read. Also, the fact that 6 are carried for marine landing centric missions is also a function of the Harrier’s inherent limitations, ESG’s mission fitting the force and not force fitting the mission. When you think creatively about a ESG’s potential composite makeup, and the flexibility it offers, I assure you my thoughts are more than valid. Even the politics of the F-35B making the CVN less relevant have been in the Washington “ether” for some time. Finally, as discussed, flexing an Amphib into a “STOVL carrier” is far from a new idea and has been used in practice many times. Once again have another read, no skimming haha!

    • aviationintel.com says:

      Also, this is not an argument to replace CVNs with LH(x)s nor increasing the size of the fleet. Also, ESGs already sail with CGs and DDGs, nobody is arguing to add more here. Nor am I saying that an ESG with F-35b embarked can match the firepower of an CSG, I clearly state the opposite. Also on ship capacity, this is also covered in the piece.

      We do agree totally on your last statement, of which there are over 150 posts on this site discussing the flawed concept behind the JSF.

  2. Mitchell Fuller says:

    Ty, thank you for a thought provoking article.

    1. The Marines in order to maximize the limited load B model can carry, should add ski jumps to their amphibious carriers (yes Navy I know these are your ships). Yes I know we are talking about internal stealth loads, but after initially stealth strikes and maybe in combo with stealth strikes external bomb racks and missile rails will be attached. It is a major failing our Gator navy does not have these jumps. They could be used now with existing Harriers, as many navies do.

    2. Based on compromises made to accommodate STOVL, which as discussed is the least number on order, and commonality down to 30% A and C model should be redesigned to maximize design in areas Ty discussed (in this and other articles he has written) where it is lacking and should be equipped with two engines and critically given extended unrefueled range. For both models this range is critical with strategic pivot to the Pacific, in any peer to peer conflict enemy is going to go after our tankers and try and take them out and or deny them access to operations area. Current crop of aircraft and F35 are and will be heavily dependent on tankering up and any potential enemy know this is our Achilles Heel. For the Navy since the forced retirement of the F 14 they have no aircraft which can provide the projection re range of protection the F 14 did and they need an aircraft, in this age of longer range, faster speed, more accurate weapons, that can. Any adversary will be gunning to take out our carriers (for this reason, like in World War 2, we need to develop string of island airfields in which to operate all three services aircraft out of re unsinkable aircraft carrier, and yes I know these island bases will be targets also).

    3. Engines, each service needs its own engine manufacturer, it is a mistake to have only one vendor for engine in a program this large, look what happened with cracked blade grounding entire fleet of all models A, B, and C. What if some other fault is found during time of conflict with engine and all models are grounded and or cannot perform to their full potential. Engine manufacturer for each service would also spread work around defense contractors without adding an undue burden to each services’ supply chain, as they would only be inventorying one type engine on ship (I expect Marines to be flying C model off of the CVNs).

    4. Wonder Helmet, keep it in research and development, maybe forever…….., and add HUD, which should be there as a backup in any case, and use tried and true helmet in interim.

    5. Questions,

    A. In a combat scenario, what is mission rate for all 3 models per day? This is key because rate = force multiplier or plane’s a hangar queen = not available for mission….. And the B, due to complexity, maybe the biggest queen onto itself + add environment where it will be operating re salt water environment……

    B. Can the skins be repaired in the theatre of operation?

    C. Based on time in development, continuous delays, failure to meet performance requirements, and increasing cost has this program missed the boat?

    Baby’s waking up gotta go.

    Cheers

  3. CharleyA says:

    I liked your piece, and I realize that you addressed the concerns that I mention. I agree with your central point about making the most out of the F-35B platform by not using it only as a direct replacement for the Harrier. But as a carrier borne aircraft, there is not much more added utility in terms of firepower than what the Harrier already does for the ARG (not withstanding better sensors,) but it adds complexity and greater operational costs for the Marines, which in turn affects other areas that need recapitalization. Where I see promise for the F-35B is flexible basing ashore, particularly where FOBs (not FARPs) can be set up and supplied, and sea basing on platforms other than LHA/Ds. The trick of course is the logistics, which has never really worked out for Harrier squadrons without a rather complex basing scheme, complete with traditional runways long enough to support C-130s and even C-17s.

  4. Sanem says:

    to think how many upgraded Harriers, UAVs and UCAVs they could have bought for the price of these goldplated, flying disasters waiting to happen F-35s, it’s depressing

    • aviationintel.com says:

      Sanem- Very depressing, how many think tanks have gamed this out now and said priority #1 should be shutting this thing down? How many ex-air force generals have laid out cases why this aircraft is far less than ideal? How many respected journalists are accused to have anti-JSF biases just because they report and react to the damning facts? Worst of all, how many upgraded F-22s, F-16s, F-15s, NGBs and UCAVs, possibly a regional bomber based on the F-22, could we buy without this stupid concept in the first place? And this is the treatment this program gets by the number 1 news outlet in the US? Nice.

  5. Bronc says:

    The Marine Corps needs a fleet of 150-million dollar supersonic STOVL stealth jets like it needs a division of war elephants. The jet can’t do CAS, wasn’t even designed to do it, and what are the chances the Marine Corps will chance the loss of 150-million dollar assets by tasking them down in the bushes?

    Even worse, the enormous acquisition costs, not to mention the operational and maintenance costs of this “asset” will fundamentally change the way the Marine Corps looks, and fights. And not for the better. If you thought forward deploying Harriers was a pain in the ass, you haven’t seen anything yet.

    Bronc

    • aviationintel.com says:

      Bronc- It will be a very effective CAS machine at standoff ranges and better than the harrier on all accounts aside from availability as that still has to be proven (although I bet 50% mission capable rates will be par).

      Very true, as the piece discusses, the F-35B will change the USMC classic expeditionary doctrine, for better or worse is depends on who you talk to. I would say for the better when it comes to the US “total force.”

      As for improvised land based FOBs, ummm yeah I really don’t see that working out well, but for countries like Taiwan or even S. Korea, small F-35B bases with light infrastructure and logistics to support the jet may be an outstanding tactic as their runways will be toast in the opening salvos of almost any conflict with their sworn enemies.

  6. aerodawg says:

    Overall good piece. I’ve been less than convinced that the B model was still relevant given the trickle down of PGMs over the last decade. I can see now there are a lot more areas where the Bravo could be very useful.

  7. Bronc says:

    This video makes my point: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rsa_uTheFDE
    As a categorical statement: jets suck at close air support.

    Point in fact, the F-35B will NEVER be able to do CAS like an A1-D, and a helo gunship does it even better than a Skyraider. It’s all a matter of perspective. If you’re a grunt, you want your CAS to actually be CLOSE. Air support is best delivered low and slow and methodically over an extended period of time. Attack from CLOSE air tend to freeze the enemy in place–it pins them down. 90% of the time, the enemy vapor-locks, they go quiet and passive and try to hide when the helo that just rolled in on them is still orbiting overhead. The 10% of the time they are still shooting, they are always shooting at the helo. Pinning the enemy gives you time to make whatever move you need to make–either in (and around) or out. Helo gunships are fearsome things and they are hunters in their own right–they live to hunt–and they are flown in a super aggressive way. Anyway, CAS should to be low and slow and methodically delivered from the perspective of the grunt.

    Now if you’re a jet pilot, you want your CAS to be high and fast and in a “UPS package delivery” short amount of time. Being high, going fast, and exiting in a hurry are the hallmarks of jets. They are hard to bring down for exactly those reasons. Attacking from on high means dropping a JDAM 95% of the time, and either it obliterates the target, or the enemy runs away. A JDAM doesn’t freeze the enemy, it doesn’t pin them. From the enemy’s perspective, all of a sudden there is a giant explosion, and if you’re still alive you will hear the jet leaving–within a couple of minutes after the drop the jet always leaves–so if you are still alive, that means you are fleeing the scene. But 99% of the time we don’t want that, that’s a bad thing, because now we don’t have time to make a move on them. You always have to get everybody together and pull everyone back 300-yards (if you’re in the open) and 200-yards (if you have a wall or a house to get behind) before the jet will release the JDAM (even a 500-pound one.) So right after the call (and the dust settles) everybody has to take off running to get an angle on anyone that’s still alive before they run off. (Assuming they didn’t already run away 30-minutes before the drop when everything got suspiciously quiet.) And it almost never works out, either the bomb got ‘em or they run off before you get a chance to get around on them. When a helo is doing it, he’s helping you move into position (either protecting you or distracting them) so when the hammer falls you are already in position and set, waiting for whatever comes running out. And let me tell you something fellars, there ain’t nothing like seeing the enemy in the open when your ready for that to happen. That’s better than sex.

  8. Richard says:

    Fine article, as always, Ty.

    Robert McNamara May be dead and buried, but his curse lives on. The mistaken belief in the concept of commonality as a cost saving design approach simply will not go away in the face of evidence to the contrary. Additionally, mission capabilities suffer as well as cost.

    The only bright spot is the Marine Corps’ history of focusing on making the most of what they have and not on what they don’t have.

    If the history of this weapons system acquisition were presented as a case study at the Air War College, one could only imagine the savage reviews it would receive. So slowly we learn from history.

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